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 During the Enlightenment, a relatively new view of commerce began to 
emerge among various thinkers across Europe and America. Doux (gentle) commerce 
argued that commerce is associated with and promotes a bundle of moral habits and 
attitudes. This bundle can be divided into what will be called the Big Six: (1) peace, (2) 
honesty, (3) trust, (4) cooperation, (5) fairness, and (6) tolerance. While numerous 
modern thinkers have defended this theory from a variety of angles, an empirical 
assessment of the theory’s validity is sorely lacking. Using various measurements of 
economic liberalization as a proxy for commerce, this study explores the impact 
liberalization has on each on the Big Six. In every case, the empirical literature finds that 
economic liberalization promotes and/or is associated with the Big Six. This indicates 













 As I write this, I suddenly realize how much I have likely annoyed numerous 
friends, family, and colleagues over the last two years with my incessant babbling about 
the latest study or piece of evidence I had come across in writing my thesis. Fortunately, 
they were all good sports about it, kindly humoring me at the very least while being 
extremely helpful at other times. First and foremost, I would like to thank my professors 
who have reviewed and shaped my thesis over the years: Shawn Reese, Ken Masugi, 
Alex Rosenthal, and Kathy Wagner Hill. Each of you contributed valuable insights and 
especially much-needed pushback. My thesis is much stronger due to your suggestions, 
questions, and mentoring.  
 Several scholars at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University have been of 
particular help and influence. Jayme Lemke read portions of my thesis and provided 
useful feedback while also inviting me to present part of it at the 2020 Southern 
Economic Association Conference. Virgil Henry Storr and Ginny Choi were especially 
helpful early on in my thesis, both providing me with useful resources and Ginny even 
being kind enough to give me a copy of their book (which plays a major role in Chapter 
2). Discussions with Don Boudreaux have been encouraging, giving me confidence in 
both my subject choice and my grasp of the literature. Peter Boettke helped point me in 
the direction of the best scholarship on the Soviet Union and communism. I would also 
like to thank the Mercatus Center as a whole for giving me the opportunity to participate 
in two different fellowships that introduced me to new sources and conceptualizations 




 Other friends and colleagues have been fantastic sounding boards, often clarifying 
concepts for me or determining the clarity of my own thoughts and presentation. Thanks 
to Phil Magness, Jason Brennan, Bob Lawson, Sarah Estelle (who took the time to read a 
portion of my thesis and provide feedback--thank you so much), Nathaniel Givens, Tyler 
Anderson, Tarik LaCour, Allen Hansen, Robert Boylan, Gregory Smith, Jasmin 
Rappleye, Neal Rappleye, Hugh Spackman, Ben Spackman, Matt Roper, Stephen Smoot, 
Mike Parker, Tanner Johnson, Jared Riddick, Spencer Marsh, and Daniel Gullotta. I have 
surely missed others, but to all you: thank you for lending your ears and your knowledge 
over the last couple years. 
 Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my wife Lissette. Her love for me has been 
proven by enduring my constant nerding out over markets and morals for the last several 
years (we both know it has been more than two on that front). Between that and her 
amazing encouragement and support, I can think of no one more deserving of the 

















I. “A Pacific System”: The Capitalist Peace 
Theory…………………..................................................................................16 
A. Interstate Violence – Part A: International Trade and Economic 
Interdependence……………………………………………...............18 
B. Interstate Violence – Part B: Market 
Systems…………………………........................................................22 






II. “Through Commerce, Man Learns…to Be Honest”: Corruption, Trust, and 
Cooperation………………………………………………………………......40 
A. Economic Freedom and 
Corruption……………………………………………………………42 
B. Communism and 
Corruption………………………………………………....................46 
C. The Chinese 
Experience………………………………………………....................49 
D. Capitalism, Democracy, and 
Corruption…………………………………………………………....52 
E. Trust and 
Cooperation…………………………………………………………..54 






















I. Economic Freedom’s Relation to Corruption……………………..................43 
II. Market vs. Nonmarket Societies on Dishonest Actions……………..…….....49 
III. Economic Freedom’s Relation to Trust……………………………………...58 
IV. Market vs. Nonmarket Societies on Trust……………………………………60 
V. World Values………………………………………………………………...72 







Although the proposition that market liberalization fosters economic growth is no 
longer seriously contested among economists, the claim that market liberalization fosters 
any kind of moral growth is far more controversial. In fact, merchants and markets have 
more often than not been on the receiving end of suspicion and disrepute.1 Herodotus 
reports the Persian king Cyrus as saying, 
“I never yet feared men who have a place set apart in the midst of their city where 
they perjure themselves and deceive each other...” This threat he uttered against 
the whole Greek nation, because they have market-places and buy and sell there; 
for the Persians themselves use no market-places, nor have they such at all.2 
 
While this was meant as a knock against the Greeks, many of their own shared 
similar attitudes about the market. For example, Aristotle argues that “retail trade” should 
be “justly censured, because the gain in which it results is not naturally made, but is made 
at the expense of other men. The trade of the petty usurer is hated with most reason: it 
                                                          
1 E.g., Virgil Henry Storr and Ginny Seung Choi, Do Markets Corrupt Our Morals? (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2019), Ch. 1-2. For anti-trade views throughout history, see Douglas A. Irwin, Against the Tide: 
An Intellectual History of Free Trade (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). For contrasting 
views on the market among European thinkers, see Jerry Z. Muller, The Mind and the Market: Capitalism 
in Modern European Thought (New York: Knopf, 2002). Deirdre McCloskey argues that a cultural shift in 
“rhetoric” surrounding businesspeople and market activity led to the Industrial Revolution and the 
subsequent explosion in economic growth. See her The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006); Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the 
Modern World (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2010); Bourgeois Equality: How Ideas, Not Capital 
or Institutions, Enriched the World (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2016). For a single-volume 
expression of McCloskey’s trilogy, see Deirdre McCloskey and Art Carden, Leave Me Alone and I’ll Make 
You Rich: How the Bourgeois Deal Enriched the World (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2020). 




makes a profit from currency itself, instead of making it from the process which currency 
was meant to serve.”3  
St. Augustine describes “traders” as those who “never attain to the grace of God” 
and are therefore “enemies of…grace[.]” Traders “know nothing of God’s righteousness, 
but seek to set up their own, and have not been submissive to God’s righteousness…How 
serious an evil [trade] is can be inferred from the Lord’s expulsion of traders from the 
temple.”4 This anti-commercial attitude continued throughout medieval Europe. In fact, 
“Jews were associated in the Christian West with the handling of money” and “the 
intellectual evaluation of an economy in which money played a central role was often 
intertwined with attitudes toward Jewry.” Money lending was left to Jews “precisely 
because they were regarded as outside the community of shared values.”5 This had dark 
implications. “In Passion plays, the negotiations between Judas Iscariot and the Jewish 
leaders of his day were portrayed as bargaining among typical medieval Jewish 
moneylenders…St. Bernard of Clairvaux, the leader of the Cistercian order, in the middle 
of the twelfth century referred to the taking of usury as ‘Jewing’ (iudaizare), and 
chastised Christian moneylenders as ‘baptized Jews.’”6 
However, an alternative view of market exchange--doux commerce--began to 
develop among various thinkers during the Enlightenment.7 The French douceur, 
                                                          
3 Aristotle, Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 29. 
4 St. Augustine, Expositions of the Psalms, 51-72, Vol. III, trans. and notes by Maria Boulding, ed. John E. 
Rotelle (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2001), 430-431. 
5 Jerry Z. Muller, Capitalism and the Jews (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 15. 
6 Ibid., 24. 
7 Albert O. Hirschman, “Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or Feeble?” Journal 
of Economic Literature 20:4 (1982): 1463-1484; The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for 




according to Albert Hirschman, “conveys sweetness, softness, calm, and gentleness and 
is the antonym of violence.”8 The most well-known proponent of doux commerce was the 
French political philosopher Montesquieu: 
Commerce cures destructive prejudices, and it is an almost general rule that 
everywhere there are gentle mores, there is commerce and that everywhere there 
is commerce, there are gentle mores. Therefore, one should not be surprised if our 
mores are less fierce than they were formerly…Commerce…polishes and softens 
barbarous mores, as we see every day.  
The natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade with 
each other become reciprocally dependent; if one has an interest in buying, the 
other has an interest in selling, and all unions are founded on mutual need…The 
spirit of commerce produces in men a certain feeling for exact justice...By 
contrast, total absence of commerce produces the banditry that Aristotle puts 
among the ways of acquiring.9  
 
Other prominent thinkers lifted their voices in support of doux commerce. “The 
spirit of trade cannot coexist with war,” writes German philosopher Immanuel Kant, “and 
sooner or later this spirit dominates every people. For among all those powers (or means) 
that belong to a nation, financial power may be the most reliable in forcing nations to 
pursue the noble cause of peace (though not from moral motives)[.]”10 In The Rights of 
Man, American revolutionary Thomas Paine describes commerce as “a pacific system, 
operating to unite mankind, by rendering nations, as well as individuals, useful to each 
other.”11 The English theologian and scientist Joseph Priestley explains,  
                                                          
commerce can be found among ancient Greeks like Plutarch and the Stoics. See Irwin, Against the Tide, 
Ch. 1. 
8 Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests, 59. 
9 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and ed. Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller and Harold S. Stone 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 338-339. 
10 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals, trans. Ted Humprhey 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 125; italics original. 
11 Thomas Paine, The Works of Thomas Paine With An Account of His Life, In Three Volumes, Vol. II 




By commerce we enlarge our acquaintance with the terraqueous globe and its 
inhabitants, which tends to greatly expand the mind, and to cure us of many 
hurtful prejudices, which we unavoidably contract in a confined situation at home. 
The exercise of commerce brings us into closer and more extensive connexions 
with our own species, which must, upon the whole, have a favourable influence 
upon benevolence; and no person can taste the sweets of commerce, which 
absolutely depends upon a free and undisturbed intercourse of different and 
remote nations, but must grow fond of peace, in which alone the advantages he 
enjoys can be had.12 
 
Though his (in)famous passage in The Wealth of Nations about the self-interest of 
“the butcher, the brewer, or the baker” is often misinterpreted as a greed-based 
characterization of market forces,13 Scottish “Father of Economics” Adam Smith14 argues 
elsewhere that “a dealer is afraid of losing his character, and is scrupulous in observing 
every engagement. When a person makes perhaps twenty contracts in a day, he cannot 
gain so much by endeavouring to impose on his neighbours as the very appearance of a 
cheat would make him lose. When people seldom deal with one another, we find that 
they are somewhat disposed to cheat, because they can gain more by a smart trick than 
they can lose by the injury which it does their character.”15 For fellow Scottish 
philosopher David Hume, “industry and...refinement in the mechanical arts” lead to “an 
encrease of humanity, from the very habit of conversing together, and contributing to 
each other’s pleasure and entertainment.” He sees “industry, knowledge, and humanity” 
                                                          
12 Joseph Priestley, Lectures on History, and General Policy; To Which is Prefixed, An Essay on a Course of 
Liberal Education for Civil and Active Life (Dublin: P. Byrne, 1788), 327-328 (italics original). 
13 “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, 
and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages” (Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Vol. 1, ed. R.K. Campbell, A.S. Skinner. Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 1981, 26-27). 
14 E.g., Jesse Norman, Adam Smith: Father of Economics (New York: Basic Books, 2018). 
15 Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael, and P.G. Stein (New York: Oxford 




as being “linked together by an indissoluble chain.”16 French-born Dutch jurist Samuel 
Ricard conveys sentiments similar to that of Smith and Hume: “Through commerce, man 
learns to deliberate, to be honest, to acquire manners, to be prudent and reserved in both 
talk and action. Sensing the necessity to be wise and honest in order to succeed, he flees 
vice…[H]e would not dare make a spectacle of himself for fear of damaging his credit 
standing and thus society may well avoid a scandal which it might otherwise have to 
deplore.”17 In perhaps one of the most famous statements of the doux commerce theory, 
the French philosopher Voltaire describes the scene of a what he calls a “peaceful and 
liberal assembly”: 
Go into the Royal Exchange in London, a building more respectable than most 
courts; there you will find deputies from every nation assembled simply to serve 
mankind. There, the Jew, the Mohammedan, and the Christian negotiate with one 
another as if they were all of the same religion, and the only heretics are those 
who declare bankruptcy; there the Presbyterian trusts the Anabaptist, the Anglican 
accepts the word of the Quaker.18 
 
Of course, “partisans of the so-called doux commerce thesis did not view markets 
through entirely rose-colored glasses,”19 nor did they necessarily agree on every angle.20 
                                                          
16 David Hume, Essays Moral, Political, Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), 
270-271. 
17 Quoted in Hirschman, “Rival Interpretations of Market Society,” 1465. 
18 Voltaire, Philosophical Letters: Or, Letters Regarding the English Nation, ed. John Leigh, trans. Prudence 
L. Steiner (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2007), 20. 
19 Nathan B. Oman, The Dignity of Commerce: Markets and the Moral Foundations of Contract Law 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2016), 43.  
20 For nuanced examinations of Smith and Hume, see Edwin Van de Haar, “The Liberal Divide over Trade, 
Peace, and War,” International Relations 24:2 (2010): 132-154; Maria Pia Paganelli, “The Moralizing Role 
of Distance in Adam Smith: The Theory of Moral Sentiments as Possible Praise of Commerce,” History of 
Political Economy 42:3 (2010): 425-441; “Commercial Relations: From Adam Smith to Field Experiments,” 
in The Oxford Handbook of Adam Smith, ed. Christopher J. Berry, Maria Pia Paganelli, Craig Smith (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2013); Maria Pia Paganelli and Reinhard Schumacher, “The Vigorous and 
Doux Soldier: David Hume’s Military Defence of Commerce,” History of European Ideas 44:8 (2018): 1141-
1152; “Do Not Take Peace for Granted: Adam Smith’s Warning on the Relation Between Commerce and 




However, the overall position of the doux commerce proponents can be summarized by 
the six following points:  
Commerce promotes and is associated with:  
1. Peace 
2. Honesty 




Each of these six points--which will cheesily be referred to from now on as the 
Big Six--is an empirical claim. This thesis will investigate the validity of each claim by 
reviewing the available social science literature. Several modern scholars have revived 
the doux commerce thesis both implicitly and explicitly in their work, providing various 
historical, philosophical, and empirical arguments in its favor.21 However, none of these 
works are as detailed and wide-ranging in their empirical assessment as the current study. 
By the end of this thesis, the empirical status of the doux commerce theory will be 
established. 
                                                          
Goodman, “Doux Commerce, Jew Commerce: Intolerance and Tolerance in Voltaire and Montesquieu,” 
History of Political Thought 37:3 (2016): 530-555.  
21 E.g., McCloskey, The Bourgeois Virtues; Bourgeois Dignity; Bourgeois Equality; Paul J. Zak (ed.), Moral 
Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); 
“Moral Markets,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 77 (2011): 212-233; Oman, The Dignity 
of Commerce; Jason Brennan, Why Not Capitalism? (New York: Routledge, 2014); Jennifer A. Barker and 
Mark D. White (eds.), Economics and the Virtues: Building a New Moral Foundation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2016); Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski, Markets Without Limits: Moral Virtues and 





Chapter 1 investigates the first claim: commerce promotes and is associated with 
peace. In international relations scholarship, democracy has been identified as a major 
source of international peace. This has become known as the democratic or liberal peace 
theory. This chapter reviews the literature of the alternative capitalist peace theory, 
which argues that economic interdependence and liberalization are major components of 
peace. It then proceeds from this macro level view down to the microlevel by reviewing 
the relationship between market liberalization and (1) intrastate war, (2) state violence 
toward citizens, and (3) violent crime between citizens. 
Chapter 2 investigates claims 2, 3, and 4: commerce promotes and is associated 
with honesty, trust, and cooperation. Using corruption as a proxy for (dis)honesty, it 
explores corruption’s relation to trade and market liberalization. Furthermore, it explores 
the relation between corruption and communism (an extreme form of economic 
illiberalism), including former communist countries and one current communist state. It 
also briefly looks at the interactions between market liberalization, democracy, and 
corruption. The chapter then explores the relation between markets and 
trust/trustworthiness through both survey-based studies and economic game experiments. 
Finally, the chapter will conclude by looking at recent research on the connection 
between market contact, economic globalization, and cooperation.  
Chapter 3 investigates the final two claims: commerce promotes and is 
associated with fairness and tolerance. This chapter will begin by looking at the market’s 
relation to fair treatment based on evidence from various economic game experiments. It 




example of fairness. Finally, it will explore the market’s relation to (in)tolerant attitudes 
and behaviors. 
Admittedly, there is quite a bit of conceptual overlap between the Big Six. 
Violence can be a manifestation of intolerance or perhaps a reaction to unfair treatment 
by corrupt systems. Distrust can be a reaction to rampant dishonesty, which leads to a 
breakdown of cooperation. Unfair treatment can be a manifestation of intolerance and 
prejudice toward certain groups. As shown above, doux commerce theorists bundled 
many of the Big Six together. While this study attempts to separate empirical 
investigations into the Big Six as neatly as possible, many could fall under several of the 
Big Six labels (especially in Chapter 3). However, the occasional blurring of conceptual 
lines hardly distracts from the overall project of investigating the empirical validity of 
doux commerce. 
Defining Terms 
This study has and will continue to employ the terms markets, market 
liberalization, or market economy as synonyms for commerce. Therefore, it is important 
to define what is exactly meant by these terms and why they have been chosen. In his 
ever-popular economics textbook Principles of Economics, Harvard’s Gregory Mankiw 
defines a market economy as “an economy that allocates resources through the 
decentralized decisions of many firms and households as they interact in markets for 
goods and services.”22 He contrasts a market economy with that of a centrally-planned 
economy, explaining that a central planner “would need to know the value of a particular 
                                                          




good to every potential consumer in the market and the cost for every potential producer. 
And she would need this information not only for [a single] market but for every one of 
the many thousands of markets in the economy. This task is practically impossible, which 
explains why centrally planned economies never work well.”23 This is why his economic 
principles include the following two: (1) “Trade can make everyone better off” and (2) 
“Markets are usually a good way to organize economic activity.”24 Mankiw’s principles 
represent the consensus in mainstream economics regarding the growth-enhancing 
efficiency of an open market economy.25 
Another of Mankiw’s principles involves governmental improvement of market 
efficiency and outcomes. The market “can work its magic only if the government 
enforces the rules and maintains the institutions that are key to a market economy.”26 In 
other words, certain kinds of institutions allow commerce to flourish. The kinds of 
institutions Mankiw generally describes are what economists Daron Acemoglu and James 
Robinson refer to as inclusive institutions:  
Inclusive economic institutions...are those that allow and encourage participation 
by the great mass of people in economic activities that make best use of their 
talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish. To be 
inclusive, economic institutions must feature secure property rights, an unbiased 
                                                          
23 Ibid., 144-145. This is known as the “knowledge problem” in economics. E.g., F.A. Hayek, “The Use of 
Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35:4 (1945): 519-530; Thomas Sowell, Knowledge and 
Decisions (New York: Basic Books, 1980); Don Lavoie, National Central Planning: What Is Left? (Arlington, 
VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016 [1985]). 
24 Mankiw, Principles of Economics, 7. 
25 E.g., David Weil, Economic Growth, 3rd ed. (New York: Pearson Education, 2013); Paul Krugman, Robin 
Wells, Economics, 5th ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2017); Tyler Cowen and Alex Tabarrok, Modern 
Principles of Economics, 3rd ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 2015); Campbell R. McConnell, Stanley L. 
Brue, Sean M. Flynn, Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies, 21st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2018). This remains the case even though “the coverage of market failure is nearly six times that of 
government failure” in the average economics textbook (Rosemarie Fike and James Gwartney, “Public 
Choice, Market Failure, and Government Failure in Principles Textbooks,” Journal of Economic Education 
46:2, 2015, 213). 




system of law, and a provision of public services that provides a level playing 
field in which people can exchange and contract; it also must permit the entry of 
new businesses and allow people to choose their careers...Inclusive economic 
institutions foster economic activity, productivity growth, and economic 
prosperity.27 
 
As noted above, government-enforced property rights are fundamental to a market 
economy.28 Empirical research finds that secure private property rights are essential to 
the economic development and prosperity of a society.29 This broad, market-oriented 
consensus covers a range of propositions and policies that are largely uncontroversial 
among economics experts,30 but often conflict with public preferences.31 Of course, 
disputes over the proper amount of governmental intervention in the economy continue 
among economists, but these disputes take an overarching market framework for 
                                                          
27 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and 
Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012), 74-75. 
28 Private ownership of the means of production is a core tenet of a capitalist system. See Robert L. 
Heilbroner, “Capitalism,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd ed., ed. Steven N. Durlauf, 
Lawrence E. Blume (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); “Capitalism” in Oxford Dictionary of Economics, 
5th ed., ed. John Black, Nigar Hashimzade, Gareth Myles (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); Robert 
Hessen, “Capitalism,” in The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, ed. David R. Henderson (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, 2008); https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Capitalism.html.  
29 E.g., Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, Francesco Trebbi, “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions 
Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,” Journal of Economic Growth 9:2 (2004): 131-
165; Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, “Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of 
Long-Term Growth,” in Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1A, ed. Philippe Aghion, Steven N. Durlauf 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005); Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, “Unbundling Institutions,” Journal of 
Political Economy 113:5 (2005): 949-995; Timothy Besley and Maitreesh Ghataka, “Property Rights and 
Economic Development,” in Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 5, ed. Dani Rodrik and Mark 
Rosenzweig (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2010); Raj Nallari and Breda Griffith, Understanding Growth and 
Poverty: Theory, Policy, and Empirics (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2011).  
30 Daniel B. Klein and Charlotta Stern, “Economists’ Policy Views and Voting,” Public Choice 126 (2006): 
331-342; Daniel B. Klein and Charlotta Stern, “Is There a Free-Market Economist in the House? The Policy 
Views of American Economic Association Members,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 66:2 
(2007): 309-334; Mankiw, Principles of Economics, pg. 31. It should be noted that markets or capitalism 
are not equivalent to libertarianism.  
31 Bryan Caplan, The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2007); Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, “Economic Experts versus Average 




granted.32 “For most economists, political scientists, and philosophers,” writes political 
philosopher Jason Brennan, “the debate is...no longer whether to have a market-based 
economy, but which kind of market economy to have.”33  
Another term that will be frequently used throughout this study is economic 
freedom. This term is based on a couple of oft-cited economic indices. The first is the 
annual Economic Freedom of the World report produced by the Canada-based Fraser 
Institute. Its indicator—known as the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) Index—
defines economic freedom based on five major areas: (1) size of the central government, 
(2) legal system and the security of property rights, (3) stability of the currency, (4) 
freedom to trade internationally, and (5) regulation of labor, credit, and business.34 The 
second is the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) developed by the Heritage Foundation 
and The Wall Street Journal. Drawing on similar measurements as the EFW Index, the 
IEF provides yearly rankings of countries’ economic freedom score.35 Given this criteria, 
economic freedom can largely be a synonym for market liberalization or a proxy for 
Acemoglu and Robinson’s inclusive institutions.  
                                                          
32 This consensus is not due to political homogeneity. Economics departments are some of the most 
politically diverse on American campuses. See Christopher F. Cardiff and Daniel B. Klein, “Faculty Partisan 
Affiliations in All Disciples: A Voter-Registration Study,” Critical Review 17:3-4 (2005): 237-255; Mitchell 
Langbert, Anthony J. Quain, and Daniel B. Klein, “Faculty Voter Registration in Economics, History, 
Journalism, Law, and Psychology,” Econ Journal Watch 13:3 (2016): 422-451; “Faculty Voter Registration: 
Rectifying the Omission of Two Florida Universities,” Econ Journal Watch 14:1 (2017): 55-60. 
33 Jason Brennan, “The Free Market,” in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, ed. William R. 
Thompson (Oxford: Oxford University, 2019): 
https://oxfordre.com/politics/politics/abstract/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190228637-e-115?rskey=eyB1Tg&result=3 
34 Economic Freedom of the World: 2020 Annual Report, ed. James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, Joshua Hall, 
Ryan Murphy (Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute, 2020). 




Overall, private ownership of scarce resources combined with decentralized 
decision-making regarding the allocation of those resources not only improves living 
standards, but allows for a greater number of individuals to freely engage in commerce 
with one another. In other words, market liberalization or economic freedom is 
predominantly the removal of political and legal barriers to exchange and economic 
association, which provides individuals with greater access to the market. This greater 
access to the market means potentially greater engagement with the market, making it a 
useful proxy for commerce. 
Varieties of Market Economies 
The indices above indicate that economies can take slightly different shapes, yet 
still reliably maintain the label of market economy. For example, a country may have a 
bigger central government, but freer trade and fewer regulations (or vice versa). Some 
scholars draw a distinction between the scope (range of activities) and scale (size) of 
government. Economists Christopher Coyne and Abigail Hall note that “the government's 
budget might stay relatively flat over time, but state actors can use the same amount of 
resources to intrude into the lives of its citizens in new and novel ways that curtail their 
freedom from external interference. This is especially likely as the real cost of producing 
the goods and services associated with social control falls because of technological 
advances over time.”36 Jason Brennan further illustrates this point by distinguishing 
between  
                                                          
36 Christopher J. Coyne and Abigail R. Hall, Tyranny Comes Home: The Domestic Fate of U.S. Militarism 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2018), 13-15. Coyne and Hall are building on the work of Robert 
Higgs. See his Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government (New York: 




the administrative state—which tries to control, regulate, manipulate, and manage 
the economy—[and] the social insurance state—which provides tax-financed 
education, healthcare, and unemployment insurance. The administrative state 
directly limits and interferes with individuals’ economic freedom...A social 
insurance state may impose high taxes, which can reduce some individuals’ 
ability to achieve their ends (though tax-funded welfare may help other 
individuals’ achieve theirs). But the administrative state directly restricts 
individuals’ choices and/or imposes various rules limiting the terms of voluntary 
trade.37 
 
Relying on the EFW and IEF indices, Brennan points out that social democratic 
Denmark is actually higher than the U.S. in a number of economic freedom rankings, 
from property rights to international trade to business freedom. As former Danish prime 
minister Lars Rasmussen stated in 2015, “I know that some people in the US associate 
the Nordic model with some sort of socialism...Denmark is far from a socialist planned 
economy. Denmark is a market economy.”38 
Sweden is another country whose economy is often confused for something other 
than a market economy, despite being one of the most economically free nations on the 
planet.39 Sweden grew rich in the 20th century thanks to property rights, free trade, and a 
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Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018, 15). 
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World in 2017,” in Economic Freedom of the World: 2019 Annual Report, ed. James Gwartney, Robert 
Lawson, Joshua Hall, Ryan Murphy (Vancouver, B.C.: Fraser Institute, 2019). Similar to Denmark, Sweden 
ranks higher than the U.S. in property rights, business freedom, monetary freedom, and trade freedom, 





lack of governmental corruption. Its economic problems from 1970 to 1995 stemmed 
from a combination of Keynesianism, subsidies for failing industries, new labor market 
regulations, high marginal taxes, and currency devaluation. Economic recovery and 
growth since the 1990s has been due to multiple reforms, including deregulation and 
decentralization, tax system restructuring, increased work incentives, enhanced 
competition, greater consumer choice in the public sector, and more global integration via 
the European Union.40 “At the beginning of the 1980s,” writes economist Andreas Bergh, 
“the Swedish economy was a highly regulated and closed economy. Today, Sweden is 
one of the most globalized countries in the world. Over the past few decades, Sweden has 
been subject to one of the most rapid increases of globalization and economic 
liberalization in the world...Outside Swedish borders, the perception of Sweden is often 
rather dated and, to some extent, still characterized by the Sweden of yesteryear.”41 While 
social democracies such as the Nordic countries provide generous safety nets,42 their 
welfare systems are paid for by productive market economies. Many of these countries 
have been somewhat successful at disentangling the administrative state from the social 
insurance state.43  
Clarification 
                                                          
40 See Andreas Bergh, Sweden and the Revival of the Capitalist Welfare State (Northampton, MA: Edward 
Elgar, 2008); “What are the Policy Lessons from Sweden? On the Rise, Fall and Revival of a Capitalist 
Welfare State,” New Political Economy 19:5 (2014): 662-694. 
41 Bergh, Sweden and the Revival of the Capitalist Welfare State, 1. 
42 With potential trade-offs in innovation, including healthcare. See Daron Acemoglu, James A. Robinson, 
Thierry Verdier, “Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World,” Journal of Political 
Economy 125:5 (2017): 1245-1305; Dana Goldman and Darius Lakdawalla, “The Global Burden of Medical 
Innovation,” USC Schaeffer White Paper (Jan. 2018): https://healthpolicy.usc.edu/research/global-
burden-of-medical-innovation/  
43 See Andreas Bergh, “Hayekian Welfare States: Explaining the Coexistence of Economic Freedom and Big 




It is important to clarify what this thesis is not investigating. First and foremost, 
this study is not seeking to answer if commerce is the only or even primary reason for the 
Big Six. This would be far too reductionist. Other factors such as tradition, religion, 
democracy, etc., certainly play a role. This thesis is simply investigating the relationship 
(if any) between commerce and the Big Six using the best available empirical data. 
Furthermore, this study is focusing only on the Big Six. The topic of moral improvement 
is controversial and involves deeply philosophical questions about what constitutes 
morality. This thesis does not investigate if commerce improves all moral attitudes and 
behaviors, but attempts to stick closely to the limited claims of the doux commerce 
theorists. Finally, this study will not involve itself in the commodification debates over 
what should and should not be for sale. This is a different argument outside the scope of 
this thesis. In the author’s estimate, the most compelling work to date on this topic is 
Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski’s Markets Without Limits. As they explain toward the 
beginning of their book, markets in certain things (e.g., child pornography, nuclear 
weapons, slaves) are not wrong because of the market. They are wrong because the 
products themselves are wrong: “It’s wrong to possess child pornography even if you 
acquired it for free. The wrongness of markets in child pornography does not originate in 
the market, but in the existence of the traded item in the first place.”44 Those interested in 
this debate will find that this current study adds nothing to it. The author recommends 
engaging with Brennan and Jaworski’s work instead.  
 
                                                          





“A PACIFIC SYSTEM”:  
THE CAPITALIST PEACE THEORY 
 
In The Better Angels of Our Nature, Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker 
documents the worldwide decline in violence and war throughout history.45  In doing so, 
he presents multiple reasons for this decline,46 including:  
● Leviathan: third-party enforcement and the rule of law.  
● Feminization: female-friendly environments and values.47  
● The Expanding Circle: increased empathy through greater literacy, urbanization, 
mobility, and mass media access. 
● The Escalator of Reason: increased use of reason through these same 
mediums.48 
Another major contender for the driver of this peaceful trend is known among 
international relations scholars as the democratic peace theory. Pinker summarizes, 
Democratic government is designed to resolve conflicts among citizens by 
consensual rule of law, and so democracies should externalize this ethic in dealing 
                                                          
45 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011). 
See also Steven Pinker, Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress (New 
York: Penguin, 2018), Ch. 11-13; Johan Norberg, Progress: Ten Reasons to Look Forward to the Future 
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2016), Ch. 5; Max Roser, “War and Peace,” Our World In Data (2016): 
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47 See also Valerie M. Hudson, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Mary Caprioli, Chad F. Emmett, Sex and World Peace 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 





with other states. Also, every democracy knows the way every other democracy 
works…The resulting trust among democracies should nip in the bud the 
Hobbesian cycle in which the fear of preemptive attack on each side tempts both 
into launching a preemptive attack. Finally, since democratic leaders are 
accountable to their people, they should be less likely to initiate stupid wars that 
enhance their glory at the expense of their citizenries’ blood and treasure.49 
 
While Pinker finds various counterexamples and “headaches” with the theory, the 
democratic peace theory has nonetheless enjoyed substantial scholarly support for some 
time.50 Pertinent to this study, Pinker offers yet another potential cause for the decline in 
violence: the Capitalist Peace.51 Invoking the doux commerce supporters above, Pinker 
argues that trade openness and economic freedom largely reduce the incentives of war 
and brutalization. Though the democratic peace theory still holds considerable weight 
among scholars, a wave of empirical research over the last couple decades has begun to 
shift the consensus toward the capitalist peace theory.52 Academics continue to debate 
over how much trade and economic freedom contributes to peace, but democratic peace 
theorists now include economic interdependence as an essential element within the 
broader liberal peace project.53 
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Of course, those in the realist tradition of international relations scholarship 
continue to balk at liberal claims, emphasizing instead the conflicting interests and power 
struggles between sovereign nation-states.54 Unfortunately, much of the realist response 
is lacking in quantitative data, which makes their work less useful in assessing the 
empirical value of the doux commerce theory. Case in point, a recent article55 by 
prominent realist scholar John Mearsheimer features no real quantitative analysis or data. 
Furthermore, he relies heavily on work from the 1980/90s, ignoring the last two decades 
of scholarship on the capitalist peace theory. Georgetown’s Paul Miller finds it 
“remarkable…that, despite decades of scholarship and change in global politics, today’s 
structural realists have revised or changed almost none of their views.”56 While realists 
may be correct regarding the limits of the liberal economic order when it comes to peace, 
the question at hand is whether the liberal economic order contributes to peace at all.  
 
Interstate Violence -- Part A:  
International Trade and Economic Interdependence 
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International trade currently receives the greatest attention when it comes to the 
capitalist peace theory and an abundance of empirical studies finds that economic 
interdependence indeed reduces interstate military conflict.57 As one pair of scholars 
states, “The positive relationship between economic interdependence and peaceful 
relationships is so well established that research now focuses on the conditions that cause 
variations.”58 Collen Goenner’s research appears to solidify the adversarial relationship 
between trade and violence: not only does trade reduce conflict, conflict in turn reduces 
trade.59 Blomberg and Hess similarly find that “violence is equivalent approximately to a 
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30% tariff” on trade.60 This further establishes that trade and conflict are to some degree 
antithetical to each other.  
A few studies offer qualifiers when it comes to trade’s pacific nature. Patrick 
McDonald finds that it is not merely trade that reduces conflict, but free trade:  
Free trade, and not just trade, promotes peace by removing an important 
foundation of domestic privilege--protective barriers to trade--that enhances the 
domestic power of societal groups likely to support war, reduces the capacity of 
free-trading interests to limit aggression in foreign policy, and creates the 
mechanism by which the state can build supportive coalitions for war. A series of 
statistical tests supports these claims by showing that lower regulatory barriers to 
trade were associated with a reduction in military conflict between states during 
the post-World War II era.61  
 
Aaronson, Abouhard, and Wang find no evidence that mere membership in 
GATT/WTO reduces conflict. However, trade between members in which both countries 
benefit is shown to reduce military conflict.62 Han Dorussen finds that trade overall 
reduces conflict, but the pacific effects tend to be industry specific. Trade in 
manufactured goods has a stronger pacifying effect than agricultural trade or trade in raw 
materials.63 Gelpi and Grieco find that trade reduces the use of military force, but only 
when the trading nations are democratic. They explain that “trade may represent part of 
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the glue that cements the ‘liberal peace’ together,” but “increased trade dependence 
cannot by itself create a ‘zone of peace’.”64 Bell and Long find a conditional pacific 
effect of trade.65 When it comes to territorial disputes or military-diplomatic strategies, 
trade decreases the likelihood of military force. However, when it comes to regime 
issues, domestic policies, or state conditions, economic interdependence increases the 
chance of military intervention (e.g., the U.S.-backed coup in trade partner Guatemala). 
Lee and Rider confirm Bell and Long’s findings specifically about trade and 
territorial disputes: “Economic interdependence decreases the likelihood of militarized 
disputes and arms races.”66 However, Lu and Thies go beyond both Lee and Rider and 
Bell and Long: between 1885 and 2000, their dataset shows that trade interdependence 
reduced militarized conflicts over territory, policy, and regime.67  
A handful of studies have questioned the pacific effects of economic 
interdependence,68 but the scholarly community has responded in force.69 As Erich 
Weede explains in his review of the literature, 
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[These skeptical studies] suffer from at least one of the following defects. Either 
they do not adequately control for conditions that raise the risk of war in a dyad, 
such as contiguity, distance, power balance, or one of them being a big 
power…Sometimes it is useful to distinguish between those military conflicts that 
remain at the level of exchanging threats and those that lead to fatalities. In case 
of divergent findings, I prefer conflict involvement rather than initiation as the 
dependent variable. In my view, coding “initiation” is nearly as difficult as coding 
“war guilt.” If one compares conflict escalation to climbing a ladder, then 
initiation rarely justifies a 0 or 100% attribution to one party while absolving the 
other one. That is why reference to guilt or initiation should be avoided in large-N 
studies. In addition, dyadic trade should not be standardized by foreign trade 
instead of GDP. If all of these shortcomings are avoided, then almost all studies 
support the proposition “peace by free trade.” There is a rather strong case for a 
commercial peace or peace by trade.70 
 
One potential, oft-cited hole in the capitalist peace theory is the outbreak of World 
War I. However, as Gartzke and Lupu note, “focusing on the outbreak of World War I to 
test this theory is problematic because it is a case chosen based on the dependent variable, 
the outbreak of war.”71 More importantly, they point out that the Great War actually 
started with two less economically interdependent nations: Austria-Hungary and Serbia. 
Military alliances with more interdependent (e.g., Germany and Russia) powers 
essentially dragged these other countries into the conflict. “Economic integration was 
incapable of forestalling conflict where integration had yet to occur.”72 
 
Interstate Violence -- Part B: Market Systems 
 “International trade is just one facet of a country’s commercial spirit,” writes 
Pinker. “Others include an openness to foreign investment, the freedom of citizens to 
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enter into enforceable contracts, and their dependence on voluntary financial exchanges 
as opposed to self-sufficiency, barter, or extortion.”73 Beyond economic interdependence, 
numerous studies have examined how economic systems impact militarization. Drawing 
on the EFW Index, Erik Gartzke finds that higher levels of economic freedom predict a 
lower probability of militarized interstate disputes.74 Gartzke shows elsewhere that more 
open economies with globally-integrated markets are less likely to experience interstate 
conflicts.75 Patrick McDonald similarly examines the domestic economy and finds that 
economies with higher levels of public property—i.e., greater governmental fiscal 
autonomy—have governments that are more willing to engage in military conflicts.76  
 Over the last two decades, political scientist Michael Mousseau has mounted an 
avalanche of evidence in favor of what he calls the contractualist peace.77 “Contractualist 
economy,” write Michael Mousseau and Xiongwei Cao, “is market-oriented 
development, characterized with extensive and regularized transactions among strangers 
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that require an element of trust…It is the pursuit of foreign markets that lie at the root of 
the contractualist peace. With deeply embedded norms of market exchange at home, 
individuals in market cultures are more likely than clientelist ones to roam the world 
seeking contracts of exchange…Since the foremost goal of contractualist leaders is 
market growth at home, among them there can be no war.”78 Mousseau describes 
contractualist economies as “social markets” rather than “free markets.” This is because 
governments in contractualist economies “are under constant pressure from the public to 
maintain a highly inclusive marketplace, particularly as regards labor. The “social-
market” label applies to the social democracies of Scandinavia as well as to the supposed 
freer-market democracies such as Switzerland and the United States.”79  
Mousseau uses a wide-range of proxies for contractualist norms. In some of his 
earliest studies, GDP per capita serves as a proxy “since developed democracies should 
be the democracies with the highest intensity of contract norms.”80 One of the more 
interesting proxies is life insurance per capita. “Life insurance contracts are perhaps the 
most-reliably non-self-enforcing type of contract there is because the delivery of service 
is expected only after the death of the policyholder: Being deceased, the policyholder 
cannot possibly sanction the insurance company for failure to comply.”81 Mousseau also 
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uses investment contracts per capita as a proxy for contractualist economies. “Like 
insurance contracts, investment contracts are reliably dependent on third-party (state) 
enforcement, since they have strong inter-temporal dimensions.” Finally, Mousseau 
employs migration data as a proxy for contract-intensive economies. “By definition a 
nation with a contractualist economy must have a robust labor market...and the quest for 
economic opportunity is the most basic motive for migration.”82 In each of these studies, 
the contractualist economy emerges as the arbiter of peace. 
Mousseau also finds in an analysis of UN voting patterns from 1946 to 2010 that 
“states with contractualist and export-oriented economies tend to agree on issues voted on 
in the United Nations General Assembly, regardless of their power status or capability, 
because they have common interests in a global order based on self-determination.” This 
can account for “the decline of war” and “why the probability of war among market 
democracies is practically zero.”83 Perhaps controversially, Mousseau claims in one of 
his latest studies: 
the state of evidence does not support the existence of a correlation of democracy 
with peace, in four simple ways: (1) no one has been able to show democracy 
significant in a clear-cut regression in analyses of fatal MIDs, crises, or wars; (2) 
every empirical defense of democracy has been rebutted, and the rebuttals remain 
uncontested despite multiple opportunities to contest them; (3) there is no 
democratic peace in the nineteenth century, when there were no contractualist 
dyads; and (4) new analyses with new data show, again, that democracies without 
contractualist economies are not in peace. With this study, a total of thirty 
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regressions are now in print documenting that the contractualist peace supersedes 
the democratic peace.84 
 
Critics of Mousseau spend most of their time defending the pacifying effects of 
democracy or recommending a tightening of capitalist peace definitions and 
methodologies.85 However, they concede that “many liberal economic factors could be 
important in reducing the incentives and tendency for states to wage war against each 
other, including secure property rights, enforceable contracts, high human capital, gains 
from trade and labor mobility, economic freedom induced growth, capital openness, and 
greater mobility of capital. These factors also largely seem to be mutually reinforcing, 
and are deeply historically entwined in the formation of early institutions.”86 In short, 
even if some scholars (such as Mousseau) overstate the case for capitalist peace, this in 
no way detracts from the evidence that it at least plays some role in the promotion of 
peace. Essentially, the academic literature strongly supports the pacifying effects of 
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economic liberalization and interdependence. This is one-step toward giving empirical 
validity to the doux commerce thesis.87 
Intrastate Violence 
The evidence above indicates that commerce plays a role in the reduction of 
interstate violence. However, is there any evidence that commerce reduces intrastate 
violence as well? A World Bank report recognizes that when it comes to civil wars, 
economic characteristics matter more than has usually been recognized. If a 
country is in economic decline, is dependent on primary commodity exports, and 
has a low per capita income and that income is unequally distributed, it is at high 
risk of civil war…Low and declining incomes, badly distributed, create a pool of 
impoverished and disaffected young men who can be cheaply recruited by 
“entrepreneurs of violence.” In such conditions the state is also likely to be weak, 
nondemocratic, and incompetent, offering little impediment to the escalation of 
rebel violence, and maybe even inadvertently provoking it. Natural resource 
wealth provides a source of finance for the rebel organization and encourages the 
local population to support political demands for secession.88 
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If the evidence implicating poverty in the onset of civil conflict is to be 
believed,89 then inclusive economic institutions may undercut intrastate war by simply 
reducing the deprivation that breeds it. However, researchers have produced robust 
evidence that market liberalization itself reduces civil violence. In particular, Indra de 
Soysa of the Norwegian University of Science and Technology has done extensive 
research on the effects of economic freedom on intrastate conflict. In a 2011 study, De 
Soysa finds that  
economic freedom [as measured by the EFW Index] lowers the risk of an onset of 
violent conflict. The statistical effect remains robust to a number of specification 
changes, and the net effect of economic freedom is larger and more significant 
than is per capita income level and regime type. Economic freedom also reduces 
political repression, which suggests that the peace effect of economic freedom is 
not working through a repression effect since rulers can suppress violence by 
using a heavy hand against the mobilization of dissent. Under conditions of fewer 
market distortions, thus, and fairer economic governance that reflects liberal 
values of free-market competition and respect for property, people seem to dissent 
less and states seem to repress less, lessening the trinity of means, motive, and 
opportunity for committing socially-costly violent conflict.90  
 
After analyzing data spanning from 1970 to 2005, De Soysa and Hanne Fjelde 
find that higher economic freedom lowers the risk of civil war, more so even than 
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democracy and good governance.91 This remains true after variables such as income per 
capita, growth rates, total population, ethnic fractionalization, and oil exportation are 
controlled for. Yet, these results likely underestimate the total impact of economic 
freedom on civil war. “In reality,” they write, “the effect of economic freedom on peace 
is likely to be larger if we also take into account the indirect effect of economic freedom 
through its impact on income growth.”92 These findings correspond with a later study by 
De Soysa and Flaten,93 which controls for the same variables and finds that higher levels 
of economic globalization—as measured by the KOF Globalization Index94—reduce the 
risk of civil war. In a 2016 study,95 De Soysa finds that overall annual increases in 
economic freedom lower the probability of civil war. When the effects of the EFW 
Index’s individual components are examined, it turns out that property rights and high-
quality legal institutions, sound money, and free trade are ultimately what reduce the risk 
of intrastate conflict. Business and labor regulations as well as government size have no 
apparent impact. De Soysa along with Vadlamannati and Ostmoe find that countries 
participating in International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs—which consist of more 
austere public budgets and greater economic liberalization—for over five months 
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experience improved ethnic peace.96 The data suggest “IMF involvement could cut the 
level of ethnic tension in a country by half.”97  
Other scholars have come to similar conclusions. Covering the period between 
1970 and 1999, Katherine Barbieri and Rafael Reuveny find that international trade, 
foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign portfolio investment (FPI) reduce the risk of 
civil war in all states observed.98 After controlling for multiple factors, David Steinberg 
and Stephen Saideman find  
that ethnic conflicts become more violent when the state is an active economic 
actor than when it is not. This relationship is robust to alternative measures of the 
independent and dependent variables, and holds for both cross-sectional and panel 
data analyses…Government controls of capital flows and foreign investment, 
government involvement in banking, wage and price controls, and government 
regulation all significantly increase ethnic violence…[N]o evidence suggests that 
any government interventions in the economy contribute to ethnic peace.99  
 
In a 2009 study, Joshua Hall and Robert Lawson employ both the EFW Index as 
well as the Global Peace Index (GPI), with a lower GPI score representing more peace. 
Hall and Lawson find “that a two unit higher EFW index, about the difference between 
the market-friendly United States and autocratic Pakistan, corresponds to a 0.5 unit lower 
GPI, about the difference between peaceful Switzerland and war-torn Bosnia.”100 In a 
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2012 study, Mousseau once again uses life insurance per capita as a proxy for market 
norms. He reports, “Analyses of armed conflict in most nations from 1961 to 2001 
showed that not a single civil war, insurgency, or rebellion occurred in any nation with a 
market-capitalist economy. This result is highly unlike to be the result of chance and, 
after controlling for every known robust variable in civil war studies, market-capitalism 
emerged as the most powerful explanatory factor in the field, by a large margin.”101  
Economist Saumitra Jha’s analysis of medieval South Asian ports finds that trade 
and low barriers to trade entry made these areas “five times less prone to Hindu-Muslim 
riots and around 25 percentage points less likely than otherwise similar towns to 
experience any religious riot between 1850 and 1950, two centuries after Europeans 
disrupted Muslim advantages in overseas trade. Between 1850 and 1950, medieval port 
towns were around ten times less likely to experience their first outbreak of Hindu-
Muslim rioting in any given year.”102 Low barriers to trade entry prevent what Jha calls 
ethnic cronyism. These “ethnic trading networks” are often “based upon personal and 
community ties” and therefore “closed to competitors...Indeed, ‘protection’ by dictators 
has been a common feature of the histories of many market-oriented ethnic minorities in 
both medieval and contemporary developing country settings.”103 This protectionism 
sows the seeds of violent conflict. 
The World Bank’s annual Doing Business report measures the ease of doing 
business in countries through multiple areas of business regulation, ranging from  starting 
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a business and obtaining permits to trading across borders and contract enforcement. 
Using data from the Doing Business rankings and the EFW Index, Michael Strong finds a 
close connection between peace, economic liberalization, and business-friendly 
environments. As a case study, Strong looks to Northern Ireland between 1975 and 2000, 
concluding that increased economic freedom, the consequential economic boom, and the 
decrease in violence were interconnected. He summarizes his findings:  
[W]hether one looks at the Doing Business rankings, which provide a narrow 
focus on the obstacles to indigenous entrepreneurship, or Fraser Economic 
Freedom rankings, which provide a broader measure of business environment that 
benefits both indigenous entrepreneurs and multinational corporations, there is a 
close fit between those nations that are regarded as peaceful and those nations that 
provide a positive environment for business.104 
 
Various organizations also acknowledge the power commerce has to reduce 
conflict and establish peace. For example, a 2016 report by the World Economic Forum’s 
(WEF) Global Agenda Council on Fragility, Violence, and Conflict includes 12 case 
studies across the globe, ranging from Afghanistan and Bangladesh to Nigeria and 
Uganda. These studies suggest that trade and integrated businesses contribute to 
prosperity, stabilization, and peacebuilding.105 The report explains, “International and 
local businesses have a critical role to play in finding ways to minimize fragility and 
build resilience. A key reason…is because fragility—including conflict and crime—is 
bad for business. It generates direct and indirect opportunity costs all along the value 
chain.”106 The case studies in a 2014 report by the United Nations Global Compact and 
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Religious Freedom and Business Foundation (RFBF) come to similar conclusions 
regarding interfaith peace.107 “Business is at the crossroads of culture, commerce and 
creativity,” writes Brian Grim, president of RFBF. “This means businesses have the 
resources to make the world more peaceful as well as the incentive to do so. Indeed, as 
these case studies show, business is good for interfaith understanding, religious freedom 
and peace.”108 
State-on-Citizen Violence 
The literature on intrastate violence does not end with two-sided violence such as 
civil wars, insurgencies, or rebellions. States throughout history—and still today—are 
known for violating the physical integrity of their citizens. Does economic liberalization 
temper this one-sided form of violence in any way? In her review of the literature, Emilie 
M. Hafner-Burton determines that “[o]ne of the key discoveries of the past few decades” 
is that international trade, FDI, and market economies are “correlated with better 
protections for human rights.”109 Similarly, Niklas Potrafke’s review of the literature 
concludes that “globalisation has improved human rights.”110 Indra de Soysa’s research 
proves extremely useful in this regard once again. In the 2011 study mentioned in the 
previous section, De Soysa finds that “economic freedom has a statistically significant 
dampening effect on political repression – a result that is unaffected by per capita income 
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or other relevant controls.”111 Utilizing the CIRI Human Rights Data Project,112 De Soysa 
and Eriksen analyze 104 developing countries between 1981 and 2003 and discover that 
economic freedom (EFW Index) increases physical integrity rights.113 In an analysis of 
118 countries between 1981 and 2005, De Soysa and Krishna Chaitanya Vadlamannati 
find economic globalization (KOF Index) to be linked to fewer governmental violations 
of human rights.114 A later study of 150 countries between 1970 and 2008 supports these 
findings, demonstrating that increased exposure to global markets reduces state violence 
toward its people.115 Finally, a 2013 analysis of 117 countries between 1981 and 2006 by 
De Soysa and Vadlamannati finds “positive effects of market-economic policy reforms 
on government respect for human rights.”116  
Several other studies support those by De Soysa and colleagues. An analysis of 
106 countries between 1981 and 2004 finds that increases in both economic globalization 
(KOF Index) and economic freedom (EFW Index) increase respect for physical integrity 
rights (CIRI).117 Another study finds trade to be “advantageous to guaranteeing human 
rights,” while FDI is also “favorable for human rights” through its impact on economic 
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development and its tendency to “reduce the political power of traditional monopoly or 
oligopoly businesses” and “the potential of corruption.”118 A 2003 study examines 
incidences of genocide between 1955 and 1997. One of the factors that decreases the risk 
of political mass murder is economic interdependence: “Countries with low trade 
openness had two and half times greater odds of having state failures culminate in geno-
/politicide…The results support arguments about the importance of a country’s 
international economic linkages in inhibiting gross human rights violations.”119  
Richards and Gelleny’s review of the literature determines that it is “mixed” on 
the relationship between human rights and economic globalization, “but lean[s] towards 
implying that in many places and times economic globalization is associated with better 
respect for human rights.”120 Their own analysis of less-developed countries between 
1981 and 1999 also finds an association: “A one-standard-deviation increase in respect 
for physical integrity rights leads to a one-standard-deviation increase in FDI as 
percentage of GDP.”121 In short, “countries with greater levels of respect for the rights to 
freedom from torture, disappearance, extrajudicial killings, and political imprisonment 
seems better able to attract capital from foreign sources.”122 This outcome is similar to 
those studies that find international conflict reduces trade. Another comparable study 
establishes a negative relationship between economic liberalization and human rights 
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violations. By testing the latter’s impact on the former, the authors conclude that human 
rights abuses “actually reduce the pace of economic liberalization.”123 These studies 
indicate that state violence toward citizens and economic liberalization are antithetical to 
each other. 
Citizen-on-Citizen Violence 
A final angle worth exploring is commerce’s relation to citizen-on-citizen 
violence (e.g., violent crime, homicide). Admittedly, the literature is scant. However, the 
few studies available can shed light on the microlevel effects of commerce. 
In a 2010 cross-country analysis, Stringham and Levendis test the effects of the 
IEF and EFW Index on homicide rates. “In both regressions,” they write, “economic 
freedom is significantly correlated with homicide rates where increases in economic 
freedom are associated with decreases in the homicide rate.”124 De Soysa’s 2016 study 
discussed previously also finds that “economic freedom has negative effects on 
perception of crime, homicide rates, actual violent crime, access to small arms and 
political instability.”125 Economist Kislaya Prasad analyzes the effects of India’s market 
reforms on violent crime.126 Hypothesizing that economic restrictions create violent black 
markets, Prasad examines the relationship between violent crime, differential gold prices 
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(“a measure of the attractiveness of gold smuggling”),127 and manufacturing output (a 
measure of industrial delicensing and reduced import restrictions). The results show that 
“[i]ncreases in the [gold price] spread are associated with increases in the murder rate, 
whereas decreases are associated with reductions in the murder rate.”128 Furthermore, 
“[s]tates with high levels of manufacturing activity...witnessed a decline in the level of 
crime relative to that in less industrialized states. The evidence suggests that it is not the 
increase in manufacturing output or income (postreform) that is behind the decline. 
Rather, the effect appears to be a consequence of the removal of controls.” Extending the 
analysis to other countries, Prasad discovers, 
the measures of trade openness have a negative relationship to the murder rate. In 
particular, as a country’s trade percentage increases (an effect plausibly caused by 
falling trade barriers), its murder rate decreases. Further, as customs revenues (as 
a percentage of tax revenues) decrease, so does the murder rate. And finally, the 
higher the black-market exchange rate premium, the higher the murder rate. These 
results are consistent with the...findings for India and provide broader support for 
the existence of an equilibrium relationship between the incidence of violent 
crime and government control of economic transactions.129 
 
Much like the studies showing violence’s negative effects on trade, FDI, and 
economic liberalization, an analysis of plant-level data in Columbia shows that violent 
crime “reduces[s] average [firm] production” and causes “some firms [to] exit the 
market. Overall, when violence increases by 1%, aggregate production...falls by 
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0.39%.”130 In the case of Columbia, violent crime makes it difficult for commerce to 
flourish.  
However, a 2015 study of U.S. data over a 30-year period finds no significant 
relation between homicide and economic liberalization. Nonetheless, it does state that 
“violent crime may tend to increase somewhat following liberalizing reforms that reduce 
government spending but decrease following policy changes that ease labor market 
regulations; tax reforms appear to have no clear effects…The only result that remains 
robust throughout all tests is that all three types of economic freedom lead to less non-
violent crime.”131 A 2019 cross-country analysis finds that increases in economic 
freedom (as measured by both the EFW Index and the IEF) lead to a decrease in 
homicide rates within countries.132 However, added controls result in no relationship 
between economic freedom and homicide. When the indices are broken down, the 
researchers find that reductions in taxes and government size can actually increase 
homicide rates. None of the other individual factors are statistically significant.133  
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This overview of the empirical literature demonstrates that economic 
interdependence and economic freedom are associated with reductions in (1) interstate 
wars, (2) civil wars and conflicts, and (3) violations of physical human rights. The 
evidence of their association with reductions in violent crime is considerably weaker, 
mainly due to the lack of available evidence rather than strong evidence against the 
association. However, even in this case, the evidence appears to lean in favor of peaceful 
markets. The first of the Big Six can therefore be answered in the affirmative: commerce 
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“THROUGH COMMERCE, MAN LEARNS...TO BE HONEST”:  
CORRUPTION, TRUST, AND COOPERATION 
As mentioned in the introduction, Adam Smith associated dishonest behavior 
(cheating) with a lack of market contact. The term corruption captures this deficiency in 
integrity well. According to the definition proposed by Ray Fisman and Miriam Golden, 
corruption is “the exploitation of public office for private gain. The private benefits of 
corruption can come in many forms—votes or jobs, for example, in addition to cash.”134 
While this definition seems to focus solely on public sector corruption, Fisman and 
Golden are quick to note that their definition “extends to private sector interactions with 
the public sphere, such as when a corporation pays bribe money to public officials to gain 
an economic advantage.”135 In essence, corruption is often collusion between public and 
private actors in which they rig the political/economic game in their favor: a high-level 
form of cheating and manipulation. One example of this form of collusion is what 
economists call rent-seeking. Randall Holcombe explains, 
Because government can compel citizens to pay their taxes and obey its 
regulations, people have an incentive to try to use government to provide benefits 
to them at the expense of others. Businesses might lobby to receive subsidies, tax 
credits, or regulations that impose costs on their competitors to create advantages 
for themselves. Interest groups might lobby for transfer payments to their 
members, or for government financial support for their organizations. These 
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transfers or favors benefit the recipients, but add nothing to the total output of the 
economy.136 
 
This often results in regulatory capture, in which “regulatory agencies are 
“captured” by the firms they regulate; that is, they end up acting in the best interest of the 
firms they regulate, rather than acting in the general public interest.”137 Relying on 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)—which “measures the 
perceived levels of public sector corruption in 180 countries and territories”138 using 
multiple surveys of business people and country experts—Fisman and Golden state flatly 
that “corruption is worse in poor countries.”139 This holds true for states and provinces as 
well. Economic development appears to be a major contributor to the reduction of 
corruption. Fisman and Golden also list a free press as a buffer against corruption. This 
opens the door for indirect effects of trade and economic liberalization on corruption. For 
example, empirical work confirms the positive effects of trade and economic 
liberalization on economic growth.140 There is even some research that suggests 
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economic freedom promotes (or at least goes hand-in-hand with) freedom of the press.141 
However, this study will examine more direct connections between market systems and 
corruption. 
Economic Freedom and Corruption 
One way of exploring this link is to employ the Fraser Institute’s annual 
Economic Freedom of the World report. The 2010 report compares the level of economic 
freedom within countries to their level of corruption (based on the CPI). On a scale of 0 
to 10—with 0 being “highly corrupt” and 10 being “highly clean”—the freest countries 
end up with an average score of 7.4, while the least free countries come to an average 
score of 2.6.142 Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski corroborate this finding. Sticking to the 
CPI’s usual 0-100 scale (with lower scores once again representing more corruption), 
Brennan and Jaworski discover “a positive correlation between countries’ degree of 
economic freedom…and countries’ lack of corruption[.]”143 
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Figure 1. Economic Freedom’s Relation to Corruption 
 
Source: Brennan and Jaworski, Markets Without Limits, pg. 99. 
The most recent Doing Business report from the World Bank notes that 
“inefficient regulation tends to go hand in hand with rent-seeking…The 20 worst-scoring 
economies on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index average 8 
procedures to start a business and 15 to obtain a building permit. Conversely, the 20 best-
performing economies complete the same formalities with 4 and 11 steps.”144 More 
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specifically, the report finds that “economies with fewer tax payments have a lower 
perceived level of public sector corruption.”145  
An analysis by Virgil Storr and Ginny Choi supports the findings above. In 
defining a market-oriented economy, Storr and Choi not only employ the EFW, IEF, and 
Doing Business indices, but also the Global Competitive Index (GCI) and World Justice 
Project’s Rule of Law Index. “Empirically speaking,” they write, “we defined a country 
as a market society if its scores were in the top two-fifths of the range of possible scores 
in each of the indices for which a score was available for that particular country.”146 Their 
results show market societies average a CPI score of 7.27 and non-market societies an 
average of 3.24.147 
Multiple studies confirm that trade,148 economic globalization,149 and economic 
freedom reduce corruption. For example, a cross-country study by Daniel Treisman 
determines that “[o]penness to foreign trade...reduces corruption,” but “would require a 
radical opening rather than a marginal shift.”150 In several studies,151 Wayne Sandholtz 
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and his co-researchers find that low levels of state control of the economy along with 
international trade and investment curtail corruption: “Greater opportunity for economic 
gain through the market reduces the incentive to resort to corrupt activities. Increased 
involvement in international trade can dampen corruption by intensifying economic 
competition, reducing the opportunities for corruption…and socializing actors into the 
predominantly Western norms of the international economy.”152  
In a 2007 review of the literature, Treisman finds “that states are perceived by 
business people and their citizens to be less corrupt if they are highly developed, long-
established liberal democracies, with a free and widely read press, a high share of women 
in government, and a long record of openness to international trade.” Treisman also finds 
that “intrusive business regulations” contribute to perceptions of greater corruption.153 
However, in a later survey of the evidence, Treisman finds no robust influence of trade 
openness on corruption. Nonetheless, he does report that higher levels of red tape on 
businesses are associated with more reports of bribery.154 A 2018 survey of the literature 
finds a number of market-oriented factors that reduce corruption, including economic 
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freedom, trade openness, globalization, and property rights.155 Overall, the evidence 
suggests that greater economic liberalization stifles the spread of corruption. “The most 
basic reforms,” writes economist Susan Rose-Ackerman, “are those that reduce the level 
of benefits under the control of public officials...If the state has no authority to restrict 
exports or license businesses, no one will pay bribes in those areas...In general, any 
reform that increases the competitiveness of the economy will help reduce corrupt 
incentives.”156 
Communism and Corruption 
In his analysis of communism’s psychological elements, Simon Kemp 
determines, “There is little evidence that having a central, command economy or state 
ownership of the means of production, distribution, and exchange were either directly or 
indirectly responsible for either such major evils as genocide, the gulags, and state-
created terror or even the comparatively minor evil of widespread corruption.”157 Kemp’s 
conclusion is a bit shocking given both the scholarship on communism’s death toll158 
(some of which he references) and the empirical studies on state violence provided in the 
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previous chapter. However, what of the evidence of communism’s--an extreme form of a 
centrally-planned economy--impact on corruption? 
Wayne Sandholtz and Rein Taagepera explore both the direct and indirect effects 
of communism on corruption.159 In their study, communism is shown to have a direct 
negative impact on the country’s CPI score (what the authors label as “elite integrity”). 
However, communism is also shown to increase both secular and survivalist values as 
measured by the World Values Survey (WVS). Secular values tend to increase elite 
integrity, while survivalist values reduce it. The negative impact of the boost in 
survivalist values ends up countering the positive effects of increased secular values. As 
Sandholtz and Taagepera conclude, “Communism…produced a culture of corruption; 
entire populations had been socialized into norms and expectations that made corruption 
part of their way of life.”160 
Recent work by Dan Ariely and colleagues offers further support for Sandholtz 
and Taagepera’s analysis.161 After testing randomly selected German citizens on their 
willingness to cheat at a die-rolling game, the authors find that those who had East 
German (socialist) roots were significantly more likely to cheat compared to those with 
West German (capitalist) roots. What’s more, the longer the exposure to socialism (i.e., 
those at least 20 years old when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 compared to those only ten 
years old), the greater likelihood to cheat. The authors note that this behavior likely 
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developed because “socialism pressured or forced people to work around official laws. 
For example, in East Germany stealing a load of building materials in order to trade it for 
a television set might have been the only way for a person to acquire a valuable good and 
connect to the outside world.”162  
This contention is supported by evidence that shows “economies with large black 
markets tend to have higher levels of corruption.”163 (It should be noted that economic 
freedom has also been found to reduce informal market activity.)164 It also provides an 
explanation for why Storr and Choi find a significant difference in attitudes between 
members of market and non-market societies. As the graph below demonstrates, 
nonmarket residents more than double the amount of market residents who believe 
avoiding fare on public transport, cheating on taxes, and bribery are justifiable. Those 
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Figure 2. Markets vs. Nonmarket Societies on Dishonest Actions 
 
Source: Storr and Choi, Do Markets Corrupt Our Morals?, pg. 172. 
  
The Chinese Experience 
Communist economies like the former Soviet Union are ultimately hotbeds of 
rent-seeking. Rather than a unique economic endeavor, Gary Anderson and Peter Boettke 
argue that the Soviet economy in practice was closer to the mercantilism found in 16-17th 
century Europe. This “neo-mercantilist” economy included a “government…headed by 
an autocrat,” extensive government intervention in the economy along with the 




selling of “monopoly status as well as various other restrictions on competitive entry,” 
and the monitoring and enforcement of these monopolies.166 In fact, “in the Soviet-style 
system one of the main functions of the police was to protect monopolists against 
competition.”167 Today’s communist China possesses similar features. 
Despite the Chinese government’s adoption of pro-market reforms since the late 
1970s,168 the Communist Party of China remains heavy-handed in its state control and 
cronyism. “Even if Chinese economic institutions are incomparably more inclusive today 
than three decades ago,” write Acemoglu and Robinson, “the Chinese experience is an 
example of growth under extractive political institutions.”169 Entrepreneurs are held in 
suspicion, while state-favored businesses “receive contracts on favorable terms, can evict 
ordinary people to expropriate their land, and violate laws and regulations with impunity. 
Those who stand in the path of this business plan will be trampled and can even be jailed 
or murdered.”170 Minxin Pei argues that Chinese property reforms in the 1990s merely 
“separated control (use) rights from ownership rights but failed to clarify ownership 
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rights, the most important component of property rights.”171 Entrepreneurs “lack political 
power” and will therefore “resort to the most effective means available—bribery—to 
help them gain an advantage to seize…assets.”172 Acemoglu and Robinson describe 
China’s economy (crediting Chen Yu) as a “bird in a cage”: “China’s economy was the 
bird; the party’s control, the cage, had to be enlarged to make the bird healthier and more 
dynamic, but it could not be unlocked or removed, lest the bird fly away.”173 
Even within this cronyistic context, research shows that the more market-oriented 
areas of China tend to be the least corrupt. Case in point, Chinese provinces with greater 
trade openness experience much less corruption. In fact, “a 1% increase in trade openness 
reduces regional corruption by nearly 0.35%.” Researchers also employ the NERI index 
of marketization, which “covers five main aspects of Chinese marketization: the 
relationship between the market and the government; the growth of the non-state 
economy; the development of the product market; the development of the factor market; 
and the market environment, including intermediaries and institutional and jurisdictional 
arrangements.” These measures of marketization and government regulation “provide 
strong evidence that deregulation reduces provincial corruption. Specifically…a 1% rise 
in the marketilization index decreases corruption by 2.72%.”174 A recent study on China’s 
anti-corruption reforms also suggests that markets actually pave the way for anti-
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corruption reforms.175 The authors’ summary of their findings encapsulates the general 
process of how markets undermine corruption: 
Reducing corruption creates more value where market reforms are already more 
fully implemented. If officials, rather than markets, allocate resources, bribes can 
be essential to grease bureaucratic gears to get anything done. Thus, non-[state 
owned enterprises’] stocks actually decline in China’s least liberalised provinces – 
e.g. Tibet and Tsinghai – on news of reduced expected corruption. These very real 
costs of reducing corruption can stymie reforms, and may explain why 
anticorruption reforms often have little traction in low-income countries where 
markets also work poorly. China has shown the world something interesting: prior 
market reforms clear away the defensible part of opposition to anticorruption 
reforms. Once market forces are functioning, bribe-soliciting officials become a 
nuisance rather than tools for getting things done. Eliminating pests is more 
popular than taking tools away…A virtuous cycle ensues – persistent 
anticorruption efforts encourage market-oriented behaviour, which makes 
anticorruption reforms more effective, which further encourages market oriented 
behaviour.176 
 
Capitalism, Democracy, and Corruption 
Proponents of democracy often trumpet democratic institutions and political 
rights as the major means of combating corruption.177 However, as Francis Fukuyama 
recognizes, 
a successful capitalist economy is clearly very important as a support for stable 
liberal democracy. It is, of course, possible for a capitalist economy to coexist 
with an authoritarian political system…But in the long run, the industrialization 
process itself necessitates a more highly educated population and more complex 
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division of labor, both of which tend to be supportive of democratic political 
institutions. As a consequence, there are today virtually no wealthy capitalist 
countries that are not also stable liberal democracies.178 
 
Graeff and Mehlkop find that these wealthy, democratic, less-corrupt states also 
tend to have larger governments.179 Yet, their analysis also finds that when “market 
forces are used to allocate capital instead of political or governmental 
considerations…corruption decreases.”180 Another pair of studies181 finds that while 
democracy can alleviate corruption, it can only do so once the economic groundwork has 
been laid. In countries with virtually no economic freedom, democracy might actually 
increase corruption. In contrast, “economic freedom alleviates corruption in any political 
environment yet it becomes more effective when the level of democracy increases.”182 
What’s more, when freedoms are empirically compared, “greater economic freedom, 
rather than greater political freedom [democracy], seems to be a more effective deterrent 
to corrupt activities.”183 Evidence from U.S. states indicates “bidirectional causality 
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between economic freedom and corruption in both the short-run and long-run. The 
bidirectional causality results suggest that although implementing policies which enhance 
economic freedom reduce corruption, corrupt governments are not likely to implement 
policies that promote economic freedom.”184 These findings suggest (1) that democratic 
institutions and political rights are bolstered by economic freedom and (2) corrupt 
governments and economic freedom are antithetical to each other. 
Joseph Connors argues, “Market competition diffuses power, and corruption 
thrives on centralized power. Thus, capitalism provides the environment that allows 
markets to keep corruption at bay.”185 The evidence above supports Connors’ 
observation. Greater trade openness and economic liberalization not only stifle corruption 
in government, but also appear to undermine the development of dishonest cultures. 
Finally, economic freedom lays the groundwork for further anti-corruption reforms and 
institutions (e.g., democracy). 
Trust and Cooperation 
“It has been argued,” writes Fukuyama, “that the market itself constitutes a school 
for sociability, by providing the opportunity and incentive for people to cooperate with 
one another for the sake of mutual enrichment. But while the market does impose its own 
socializing discipline to some degree…sociability does not simply emerge spontaneously 
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once the state retreats. The ability to cooperate socially is dependent on prior habits, 
traditions, and norms, which themselves serve to structure the market.”186 Fukuyama is 
not alone in his assessment. David Rose argues that “successful societies” (which he 
describes as “free market democracies”)187 achieve “general prosperity and freedom” 
through “trust dependent” institutions.188 These institutions require a “trust-producing 
culture” that transmit “trust-producing moral beliefs” to subsequent generations.189 
“High-trust societies are the key to unlocking the unfathomable power of cooperation.”190 
Rose certainly has support for his position. A vast literature finds that trust plays a 
significant role in economic growth.191 Similarly, a large empirical literature finds that 
trust and corruption share a reciprocal relationship, creating “vicious circles of low trust 
and high corruption as well as virtuous circles of high trust and low corruption.”192 From 
this perspective, trust is foundational to market societies. For example, a 2010 study finds 
that low trust predicts support for more government regulation. However, regulation in 
turn generates distrust, consequently lowering parental values of tolerance and respect.193 
Berggren and Bjornskov find that high-quality legal systems that protect private property 
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rights “are more probable the more people trust each other.” Also, “social trust makes it 
more likely that policy reforms that decrease the scope of regulation take place.”194 On 
the flip side, social trust decreases the probability of policy reforms that retreat from 
property-protecting legal systems or increase regulation. In short, as Fukuyama and Rose 
argue, trust influences the types of institutions societies create. This alone bodes well for 
the prosocial outlook of commerce: market economies are trust-based economies. 
Markets require trusting attitudes and trustworthy behaviors in order to function 
efficiently. Even if trust is foundational and gives rise to market systems (instead of vice 
versa), it seems plausible that markets reinforce these virtues by imbuing them with 
value. As Paul Zak argues, “Moral behavior is necessary for exchange in moderately 
regulated markets...to reduce cheating without exorbitant transaction costs. Market 
exchange itself can also lead to an understanding of fair exchange and in this way build 
social capital in non-market settings.”195 Is there any evidence for this latter claim? 
Trust: Survey Data 
Various survey-based studies offer support for the market systems’ positive 
effects on trust. Using cross-country data, Christian Bjornskov attempts to lay out some 
determinants of generalized trust. He finds that factors such as income inequality, the 
population share of Catholics and Muslims, and monarchies have a significant impact on 
generalized trust. For this paper’s purpose, Bjornskov’s most significant find is post-
communism’s relationship to trust: “Post-communist countries are less trusting than 
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others, partly due to the detrimental effects of having had a communist regime, partly due 
to the disruptive effects of dismantling the fundamental organization of society when 
communism collapsed.”196 This complements Zak and Knack’s analysis, which shows 
that institutions that protect private property rights have a positive and significant impact 
on trust.197 
Utilizing data from the EFW Index and the WVS, a 2006 study runs cross-country 
regressions with over 50 countries for the years 1995 and 2000.198 The authors find that 
economic freedom—especially a market-friendly legal system with secure property 
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Figure 3. Economic Freedom’s Relation to Trust 
 
Source: Berggren and Jordahl, “Free to Trust,” pg. 154. 
Drawing on the Eurobarometer surveys (instead of the usual WVS) and the EFW 
Index, Antonio Saravia looks at the effects of economic freedom on generalized trust for 
the years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1995. After controlling for GDP per capita, income 




Protestantism, Saravia finds that a 10% increase in the EFW Index leads to a 2.5% 
increase in generalized trust.199 
A 2017 study explores data from 98 countries between the years 1994 to 2004. 
Drawing on the WVS, IEF, and European Values Study (EVS), the authors conclude, 
“There seems to be little direct effect of economic freedom on trust in general, yet, we do 
find that in Western countries, where capitalism seems most advanced, there is a positive 
effect of capitalism on trust.”200 According to the results, Western countries boost trust. 
This would seem to confirm the view of one doux commerce skeptic: “the doux 
commerce thesis is itself a ‘cultural artefac[t]’ that cannot be divorced from the Western 
traditions that gave rise to it.”201 However, Western countries have a significant negative 
effect on both personal and institutional trust when economic freedom is zero, indicating 
that “economic freedom does indeed play a role in producing greater trust among the 
Western societies[.]”202 
Storr and Choi find that “everyone appears to equally trust those at a short social 
distance (i.e., trust in family and neighbors) both in market and nonmarket societies,” yet 
“trust appears to deteriorate as social distance increases and appears to deteriorate quicker 
in nonmarket societies. Compared to those living in nonmarket societies, on average, 
more people in market societies express that they at least somewhat trust their known 
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associates (including friends and colleagues), those they meet for the first time and 
strangers.” Or, in other words, “people around the world seem to have equally strong core 
networks, but those living in market societies seem to have stronger periphery 
networks.”203 
Figure 4. Market vs. Nonmarket Societies on Trust 
 
Source: Storr and Choi, Do Markets Corrupt Our Morals?, pg. 180. 
In support of these highlighted studies, a review of the survey-based literature 
confirms that “there is…considerable evidence that experiences of institutional 
                                                          




quality…causally influences social trust.”204 Market-based economic institutions appear 
to have a positive impact on trust. However, one of the criticisms of the trust literature—
one of the “deadly sins”—“is that responses to the trust question [in surveys] do not 
generally predict trusting behavior in real-world micro-level experiments or in trust 
games…People are always more trusting and trustworthy in experiments and games than 
they would appear to be in surveys[.]”205 This suggests that microlevel data is a more 
accurate way to measure institutional influence on trust.  
Trust Games 
Storr and Choi perform two different laboratory experiments to test the effects of 
market interactions on trust.206 In one experiment, participants are able to engage in 
buying and selling with the option to cheat on accepted offers. This results in the cheater 
(an option available only to the one proposing the offer) obtaining both the good and the 
cash, leaving the trade partner empty-handed. This design is meant to make “dealing with 
a cheater costly. As such, it should be harder to develop positive relationships 
characterized by trust and reciprocity in our trading game than in actual markets.”207 
These market interactions are then followed up with trust games in which the trustor 
splits a particular sum and sends it to the trustee. The amount is multiplied enroute to the 
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trustee, who is then given the opportunity to split the sum between the two or keep the 
entire amount. “The trustor’s transfer is popularly interpreted as measuring trust…The 
trustee’s transfer in popularly interpreted as measuring trustworthiness[.]”208  
Storr and Choi discover “that market interactions promote the emergence of 
interpersonal trust and that the observed heterogeneity in trust is directly correlated with 
the perceived quality of a subject’s particular market interactions.”209 The results show 
that trustors send nearly 50% more tokens (5.3 vs. 3.5) to those they have positive market 
interactions with than to those with whom they share negative experiences (cheaters). 
Even strangers (i.e., people they never completed a deal with) receive more tokens than 
cheaters. Similarly, trustees reward those they have positive relationships with more than 
negative relationships. However, trustees appear to treat negative, ambiguous, and 
stranger relationships equally. Storr and Choi conclude, “Arguably, our experiment 
suggests that it is possible for individuals to develop positive relationships characterized 
by trust and trustworthiness within a market setting and for those positive market-
originated relationships to carry over into nonmarket settings.”210 However, the results 
cannot indicate the extent of the spillovers or the depth of the market-forged 
relationships. 
In a second experiment, Storr and Choi remove the ability to cheat, with 
acceptance of an offer resulting in the immediate exchange of goods and cash. In follow-
up trust games, the participants treat positive relationships the same as strangers. “In 
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other words, a culture where everyone treated others more or less equally and 
indiscriminately emerged in this new experimental market while a culture where people 
discriminated between the trustworthy and untrustworthy emerged in the original 
experimental market.”211 The authors stress that participants “had no ability to 
communicate with one another except through their offers and counter offers. And, they 
knew nothing about the other subjects in the experimental market…except for an 
experimental identity that made them recognizable to other subjects throughout the 
experiment.”212 This means the relationships are purely commercial, with no distortions 
stemming from race, sex, religion, etc. In short, when corruption and dishonesty are 
absent from the marketplace, trust and equal treatment emerge. When corruption and 
dishonesty are factors (as they are in the real world), trustworthiness is incentivized and 
dishonesty is stigmatized.213 
Using similar trust games to Storr and Choi, Omar Al-Ubaydli et al.’s laboratory 
experiments prime random participants to unconsciously think about markets. The results 
indicate that a market mindset makes people more trusting of others. The researchers 
explain, 
Using randomized control, we find evidence that priming markets leaves people 
more optimistic about the trustworthiness of anonymous strangers and therefore 
increase trusting decisions and, in turn, social efficiency…Absent markets, 
economic interactions with strangers tend to be negative. Market proliferation 
allows good things to happen when interacting with strangers, thus encouraging 
optimism and leading to more trusting behavior. Participation in markets, rather 
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than making people suspicious, makes people more likely to trust anonymous 
strangers. Our results seem therefore to corroborate the idea of doux commerce.214 
 
Another study selects internet business professionals from two cutthroat 
industries: domain trading and online adult entertainment. Multiple laboratory games 
between these internet professionals and Berkeley students yield surprising results: 
“Compared to students in the lab, internet business people were twice as likely to be 
trustworthy and over 50% more likely to trust in a trust game. Internet business people 
contributed over 250% more in dictator games. They lie one-third less often than 
students.” In short, “internet business people were, on the whole, ‘nicer’ than 
students.”215 The researchers in an earlier study perform similar experiments with 
company CEOs and students. Although CEOs are often caricatured as being “particularly 
selfish,” the results of the experiments display a “sharp contrast to this conjecture”: “in 
our experiments CEOs exhibited much more trusting and trustworthy behavior than 
students and, as a consequence, they achieved substantially higher efficiency levels in 
their transactions.”216 
Finally, an interesting 2010 study uses both surveys and trust games to analyze 
trusting and trustworthy behavior among three villages in rural China.217 Surveys are 
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used to measure “local trust” (i.e., toward friends and families), while trust games are 
used to measure “generalized trust” (i.e., toward the larger community, including 
possibly strangers). The results of the trust games indicate that trusting and trustworthy 
behavior go hand-in-hand. Furthermore, households with high levels of generalized 
trust218 are more liable to participate in formal labor markets rather than informal labor 
exchanges with friends and family. While the direct of causality between markets and 
trust is not established, the authors note that it is possible “that trust and formal 
institutions are complements in the sense that greater trust results in greater market 
participation.”219 Trust results in market-based cooperation with strangers and market-
based cooperation with strangers builds generalized trust. 
Cooperation 
Trust and trustworthiness ultimately manifest in efficient cooperation. “The most 
successful societies,” explains Rose, “are those that support the greatest scale and scope 
of cooperation. To get the most out of large-group cooperation we have to be able to trust 
each other in large-group contexts.”220 In essence, cooperation is trust and trustworthiness 
put into practice. Nancy Buchan of the University of South Carolina has done extensive 
work on the effects of economic globalization on cooperation. In agreement with Storr 
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and Choi, an early study by Buchan and others demonstrates that cooperation declines 
with increased social distance (e.g., neighbors vs. strangers).221 
In several studies,222 Buchan and her colleagues draw samples from the general 
populations of Italy, Russia, Argentina, South Africa, Iran, and the United States. The 
participants then engage in contribution experiments in which they are able to allocate 
resources to a personal, local, or global account with varying returns. “Among subjects 
drawn from the general populations of six countries widely varying in levels of 
globalization,” Buchan et al. write,  
our results demonstrate that higher levels of globalization, at both the aggregate 
country and individual levels, are associated with greater propensities to favor 
cooperation with globally distal others compared with compatriots living in the 
same locality…In other words, globalization may reduce an individual’s 
perceived social distance with geographically distant others, thus being conducive 
to an increased propensity to cooperate with them[.]223  
 
However, when the separate effects of economic, political, social, and cultural 
globalization are teased out, the influence of economic globalization “is not significantly 
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different from zero.” The influence of the other three on cooperation are both positive 
and significant. Buchan and Grimalda suggest that “economic globalization…is the least 
likely to reduce social distance with global others” compared to other forms of 
globalization.224 
While the study reports no negative effects of economic globalization on 
cooperation, its seemingly insignificant impact goes against the notion of trust-promoting 
markets. Yet, there appears to be more overlap between the categories than a cursory 
reading might reveal. The researchers define economic globalization as “involvement in 
economic transactions that transcend borders. This includes the purchase or consumption 
of commodities produced by multinationals or foreign firms, the use of instruments of 
monetary or financial transactions that are global in character, and whether one is 
employed in a multinational firm or belongs to professional organizations that span 
borders.” Social globalization refers “to personal interactions that connect an individual 
to distal others,” including “technology-mediated personal contacts among people (e.g., 
e-mail and mobile phones)[.]” Cultural globalization includes “an individual’s 
connectedness, consumption, and involvement in transnational and 
international…information and cultural products (e.g., news, music, art, and 
religion)[.]”225 
The study shows that both social and cultural globalization have positive and 
significant effects on cooperation. However, based on the way the authors define them 
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here, both are arguably forms and/or results of economic globalization.226 “Technology-
mediated personal contacts” require global markets in technology. Multinational 
companies like Facebook, Google, and Apple provide popular means of communicating 
with people across the world, making global sociality possible. Global markets build 
social networks. People also buy and sell cultural products like music and art on the 
international market. For example, an American male in Texas might enjoy watching the 
Japanese anime series Haikyuu!! through a paid subscription to an America-based 
streaming company (Netflix). When the Japanese anime studio (Production I.G.) releases 
the next season, this Texan may consume it through another paid subscription to a 
different American distributor (Crunchyroll). While waiting for the new season to come 
out, he may listen to the series’ OP songs through a paid subscription to a Swedish 
streaming outlet (Spotify) as he reads the translated manga version he ordered through a 
multinational corporation (Amazon). Both social and cultural globalization as defined by 
Buchan and Grimalda are mediated through economic exchange. This indicates that their 
study’s results may actually undersell the positive impact of economic globalization 
through too narrow a definition. 
Devesh Rustagi and colleagues further capture the cooperation-inducing nature of 
markets. Their study relies on individuals from 49 forest user groups in Ethiopia. The 
Ethiopian government had given these pastoral groups “secure tenure rights to use and 
manage their forests as common property resources.”227 Using a public goods game 
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similar to Buchan et al., the researchers discover that—after controlling for elevation, 
group size, share of female members, and heterogeneity in livestock ownership—those 
living closer to markets are more cooperative.228 “Here market contact seems to have 
caused people to be more cooperative in anonymous situations…[T]he experience of 
markets changes our sociality to make it easier to construct and enforce certain kinds of 
institutions – increasing institutional quality.”229 
Summary 
“Market systems require a high degree of generalized trust and trustworthiness in 
order to function,” observes philosopher Jason Brennan. “Consider the fact that I could 
fly to Hong Kong, a city I have never visited, flash a credit card, and be supplied a luxury 
car, all on my promise to pay. Somehow, markets societies make this promise mean 
something.”230 In general, the evidence above supports the following conclusions: (1) 
greater trade openness and economic freedom are associated with reductions in 
governmental corruption as well as reductions in more widespread dishonest behavior; 
(2) economic freedom lays the groundwork for further anti-corruption reforms and 
institutions (e.g., democracy); (3) trust and markets are engaged in a virtuous cycle, with 
market exchange both requiring and incentivizing trusting/trustworthy behavior. It 
appears that greater market exposure is also associated with increased cooperation. 
However, narrow definitions of economic globalization seem to drive down the potency 
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of its relationship with cooperation. Nonetheless, no negative effects are found. All of 
this indicates that numbers 2, 3, and 4 of the Big Six can be answered in the affirmative: 



















“COMMERCE CURES DESTRUCTIVE PREJUDICES”:  
FAIRNESS AND TOLERANCE231 
Drawing on his analysis of the World Values Survey, political scientist Ronald 
Inglehart writes, “People’s values and behavior are shaped by the degree to which 
survival is secure.”232 These values fall under the broad categories of Materialist vs. 
Postmaterialist outlooks. The former focuses on economic and physical security (also 
known as “survivalist” values), while the latter places an emphasis on individual choice 
(also known as “self-expression” values).233 “People with Self-expression values give 
high priority to...tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision-
making in economic and political life…The shift from Survival values to Self-expression 
values also includes a shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on hard work toward 
emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child.”234 When it 
comes to “the ratio between Materialists and Postmaterialists,” Inglehart notes that it 
“varies tremendously according to a society’s level of economic development. Low-
income countries and strife-torn countries show an overwhelming preponderance of 
Materialists, while prosperous and secure ones are dominated by Postmaterialists.”235 
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Economic development creates the conditions necessary for a cultural shift in 
values. Furthermore, economic globalization “transfer[s] capital and technology 
to…countries throughout the world, raising their levels of existential security and 
bringing greater openness to new ideas and more egalitarian social norms.”236  
Figure 5. World Values 
 
Source: The Inglehart-Welzel Map, WVS Wave 6 (2010-2014); 
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp  
 
                                                          




Interpreting the graph above, social psychologist Jonathan Haidt sees the shift in 
values as two-fold. “Pre-industrial farming cultures,” he writes, “generally have 
traditional and survival values (they cluster in the bottom left quadrant of the map). Life 
is hard and unpredictable, so you should do your duty, pray to the gods, and cling to your 
extended family for protection.” However, as societies become wealthier, they tend to 
take the next two steps: 
First, countries move...from traditional/survival values to secular/survival values. 
When money comes from fitting yourself into the routines of factory production, 
there’s little time or room for religious ritual. People express materialistic 
values...they want money, not just for security, but for the social prestige it can 
buy...But if you just wait a few generations, you usually get the second step. 
Societies transition to more service-based jobs, which require (and foster) very 
different skills and values compared to factory jobs…The generation raised with 
these “open minds” and “expressive values” starts caring about women’s rights, 
animal rights, gay rights, human rights, and environmental degradation. They start 
expecting more out of life than their parents did...Capitalism changes 
conscience.237 
 
The data above suggest that economic development produces an environment that 
allows values like fairness and tolerance to thrive. Haidt sees this development as the 
outcome of market-based systems; an indirect consequence of economic liberalization. 
However, Haidt also seems to suggest it is not simply the economic results of the market 
that produce these values, but the work of the market itself. This chapter will examine 
more direct connections between the market, fairness, and tolerance. 
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  Before looking at the evidence of doux commerce’s relation (or lack of) with 
fairness, it is important to define what is meant by fairness. In this study, fairness means 
the impartial and equal treatment of others under similar circumstances. In The 
Righteous Mind, Jonathan Haidt explains the six foundations of human morality in what 
is known as the Moral Foundations Theory. Two of these foundations are related to this 
study’s definition of fairness. One focuses on reciprocity and proportionality: “people 
should be rewarded in proportion to what they contribute, even if that guarantees unequal 
outcomes.”238 This falls in line with Montesquieu’s concept of “exact justice.”239 The 
other moral foundation captures the egalitarian impulse for equal rights alongside an 
aversion to dominating hierarchies. It serves as “the moral matrix of revolutionaries and 
‘freedom fighters’ everywhere” and, in Haidt’s view, the Declaration of Independence’s 
claim that “all men are created equal.”240 Or, to relate it once again to Montesquieu, his 
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belief that “men are born in equality...Society makes them lose their equality, and they 
become equal again only through the laws.”241  
The focus on fair treatment helps avoid potential mismeasurements. For example, 
some may point to income inequality as evidence of unequal or unfair treatment. Though 
an interesting and important inquiry, doux commerce theorists never appear to claim that 
commerce will result in equal economic outcomes, putting it outside the scope of this 
thesis. Plus, it is difficult to disentangle income inequality due to unfair treatment from 
income inequality due to merit or preferences. As Nobel economist Angus Deaton points 
out, “progress creates inequality, and...inequality can sometimes be helpful--showing 
others the way, or providing incentives for catching up--and sometimes unhelpful--when 
those who have escaped [poverty] protect their positions by destroying the escape routes 
behind them.”242 While unfair treatment that contributes to income inequality may be 
highlighted in this chapter, income inequality as a whole will not be addressed. 
Economic Game Experiments 
Researchers have advanced a number of experimental bargaining games in order 
to better understand human behavior. The ultimatum game, for example, provides a 
specific sum of money to two interacting participants. One participant is given the power 
to divide the sum between the two. If the other player accepts the division – whether it be 
50:50 or 99:1 – then both players keep their share. If the second party rejects the offer, 
both go home empty-handed. Cultural anthropologist Joseph Henrich finds that proposers 
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from industrial societies (i.e., United States, Indonesia, Japan, Israel) tend to make offers 
of between 44 and 48 percent, while the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon only offer 
26 percent.243 Furthermore, responders from industrial societies reject offers below 20 
percent as “unfair” whereas the Machigeunga do not, saying that “they would always 
accept any money” and that “it was just bad luck that they were responders, and not 
proposers.”244 Experiments with 15 small-scale agrarian societies – consisting of hunter-
gatherers, horticulturalists, nomadic herders, and sedentary farmers – find groups that are 
more heavily immersed in trade and market exchange with outsiders to be less likely to 
make inequitable offers.245 Later experiments confirm “that fairness (making more equal 
offers) in transactions with anonymous partners is robustly correlated with increasing 
market integration.”246 The researchers explain,  
extensive market interactions may accustom individuals to the idea that 
interactions with strangers may be mutually beneficial. By contrast, those who do 
not customarily deal with strangers in mutually advantageous ways may be more 
likely to treat anonymous interactions as hostile or threatening, or as occasions for 
the opportunistic pursuit of self-interest.247 
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 Market institutions therefore aid in the establishment of social norms of trust, 
cooperation, and fairness as well as a kind of “other-regardingness.”248 “Empirically,” 
write Henrich and his co-authors, “the smaller-scale, least anonymous, and most face-to-
face societies are generally less prosocial...while larger, more complex, and more 
anonymous societies are more prosocial.”249 
Gender Equality 
Equal treatment of women continues to be a global issue. According to a recent 
study, women “are accorded about three-quarters the number of rights as men” in the 
average country.250 As a means of addressing this inequality, philosopher Ann Cudd 
contends that a market economy “promotes social innovation, in particular the destruction 
of harmful, patriarchal traditions.” Economic liberalization, she says, “tends to bring 
women out of the home and into public life in the marketplace by making their labor 
outside of the home more valuable than it is within.”251 Obviously, not all women have a 
desire to participate in the labor market. However, “[l]ow levels of economic 
participation...have important implications for wider aspects of women’s position. Their 
absence from the public sphere implies more presence in the private one, resulting in 
power imbalances and gender inequalities. Women’s limited access to economic 
opportunities reduces their resilience and makes them financially dependent on men, 
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which creates and maintains other types of dependence (affective, social, in terms of 
decision-making, and so on). It also constrains their access to basic needs such as health 
and education.”252 This is why Cudd believes market liberalization “reduces the 
oppression of traditional societies that impose hierarchies of gender and caste.”253  
Historical examples seem to back Cudd’s claim. Case in point, marriages in 
preindustrial societies were “dominated by considerations of status. The husband’s legal 
position as owner of everything, along with his role as head of household production and 
the wife’s corresponding inability to write contracts or own property in her own name, 
made the wife subservient to the husband.” As industrialization moved more and more 
economic activity outside of the home, “the split between market and household 
production eroded some of the male’s dominance over the household as he could no 
longer treat wives and children as inputs to the generation of household income.”254 In 
economist Steven Horwitz’s estimation, “[o]ne of the key barriers” to this transformation 
in family/gender relations “in the early twentieth century was labor market protective 
legislation that limited women’s employment options. These laws applied to women only 
and specified maximum hours, minimum wages, and working conditions for a number of 
jobs that had a significant female presence. Some jobs were also off-limits to women 
under any conditions.”255 The “gradual disappearance” of these legal barriers “over the 
course of the century was a victory for classical liberal notions of equality.”256 By the 
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1970s, American women had entered into what Claudia Goldin calls “a quiet revolution” 
regarding their economic status, including expanding career opportunities and changing 
identities that were no longer necessarily rooted in their relationship with men.257 
Economist Victoria Bateman forcefully argues that “anonymous markets...opened doors 
for women...Indeed, one of the most noticeable aspects of the period in the twentieth 
century which was associated with a return to free-market thinking was a social 
revolution. Rapid social change culminated in dramatic changes in the laws affecting 
homosexuals, ethnic minorities and women.”258 What is the empirical evidence--if any--
for these claims regarding women and the market? 
According to Heath and Mobarak, the garment sector in Bangladesh has grown 
significantly since the 1980s and currently makes up more than 75% of the country’s 
export earnings. About 80% of their garment factory workers are female, while around 
15% of women between 16 and 30 years-of-age work in the industry. Heath and Mobarak 
find that closer proximity to a garment factory and consequently greater exposure to this 
export-heavy industry leads to a number of different outcomes for women. These include 
delayed marriage and childbearing (and thus reduced child marriage) and more years of 
educational attainment (and thus a more narrow gender education gap). This seems to 
indicate greater female valuation in the family and society at large as well as greater 
female autonomy.259 
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Looking at China, Yu, Zhang, and Wen find that foreign investment liberalization 
boosts female promotions and skills, both of which contribute to women’s economic 
status and independence.260 This economic independence is often associated with other 
forms of independence and independent attitudes. For example, a rural woman in modern 
China who migrates to the city for economic opportunities is “more likely to meet her 
future husband on her own, marry later, want fewer children, give birth in a hospital, seek 
equality in marriage, and view divorce as an acceptable option. More than 60 percent of 
migrant women in one survey cited either ‘building a happy home’ or ‘having a partner in 
the career struggle’ as the purpose of marriage, while fewer than 10 percent chose 
‘having someone to rely on for life.’”261 
Richards and Gelleny explore the effects of economic globalization--measured by 
FDI, portfolio investment, trade openness, and IMF and World Bank structural 
adjustment policies--on “the extent to which women are able, both in an absolute and 
relative sense, to exercise precise rights codified in a large body of international human 
rights law and to enjoy the objectives of those rights” (what they call women’s 
“status”).262 Overall, they find, 
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First, women’s status in a given country appears to be reliably associated with that 
country’s involvement in the global economy. Second, the relationship between 
economic globalization and women’s status differs by type of globalization, type 
of status, and era. Third, we found more support for the claim that economic 
globalization should improve women’s status, than for the claim that it should be 
expected to degrade women’s status. Sixty-seven percent of the statistically 
significant globalization coefficients indicated an association with improved 
women’s status.263 
 
Neumayer and De Soysa find that increased trade openness reduces forced labor 
among women and increases their economic rights, including equal pay for equal work, 
equality in hiring and promotion practices, and the right to gainful employment without 
the permission of a husband/male relative.264 Analyzing global data between 1981 and 
2007, they also find that increased trade openness improves not only economic rights but 
social rights as well. These rights consist of (1) the right to initiate a divorce, (2) the right 
to an education, (3) freedom from forced sterilization, and (4) freedom from female 
genital mutilation without consent.265 A 2006 study looks at four measures of women’s 
equality: (1) life expectancy at birth, (2) female illiteracy rates past 15 years of age, (3) 
female percentage share of the workforce, and (4) female percentage share of seats in 
parliament. The authors find “that more often than not, when domestic cultures are more 
open to international influences, outcomes for women improve, as measured by health, 
literacy, and participation in the economy and government. Membership in the UN and 
World Bank, along with international trade and investment activity, are frequently 
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associated with improved outcomes for women.”266 A 2008 study also finds that the level 
of economic freedom yields a stronger beneficial net impact than democracy for four 
measures of women’s absolute well-being (life expectancy, literacy rate, fertility and 
contraception use by women) and four measures of relative gender equality (female to 
male ratios of life expectancy rates, literacy rates, secondary education enrollment and 
labor force participation).267 Furthermore, a 2011 study measures the effects of economic 
freedom on the United Nations Development Project’s five components of women’s 
wellbeing. These five components are divided into three main categories: Reproductive 
Health (maternal mortality and adolescent fertility), Empowerment (female parliamentary 
representation and educational attainment), and Labor Market (female labor force 
participation rate). The author concludes that economic freedom improved all five 
between 1995 and 2008.268  
In 2017, the Fraser Institute adjusted Area 2 of its EFW Index – legal system and 
property rights – to account for gender inequality.269 This new Gender Disparity Index 
(GDI) draws on the World Bank’s Women, Business, and the Law reports and includes 
the following variables: (1) freedom of movement, (2) property rights, (3) financial 
rights, (4) freedom to work, and (5) legal status.270 Complementing the research above, 
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the adjusted EFW Index finds that women in countries with higher levels of economic 
freedom experience greater well-being in a number of areas than those in countries with 
lower levels of economic freedom:  
● Women in economically free countries have a labor participation rate of 67.97% 
compared to 50.52% in the least free countries. 
● Women in economically free countries are over 2.5 times more likely to work in 
the formal sector compared to those in the least free countries. 
● Women live nearly 15 years longer, on average, in economically free countries.  
● The literacy rate for adult women is, on average, 50% higher in economically free 
countries and 30% higher for adolescents.  
● 96.7% of young girls in economically free countries complete the last grade of 
primary school compared to 80.11% of those in the least free countries. 
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Figure 6. Economic Freedom’s Relation to Gender Equality 
 
Source: “Economic Freedom of the World in 2018,” pg. 21. 
The evidence above appears to support the notion that economic liberalization is 
associated with the improved opportunities for women, leading to their more equal 
treatment in various sectors of society.  
Tolerance 
Some skeptics of the doux commerce theory point to “the recent clashes between 
LGBT couples and business owners who decline, from religious conviction, to provide 
services for same-sex weddings. Neither side is willing to look the other way, as the doux 
commerce thesis suggests they should--neither the LGBT couples, who could easily find 




money, and avoid lawsuits, by providing them.”272 However, others point to the exact 
opposite. For example, GMU economist Tyler Cowen praises “American big business” 
for leading  
the way toward making America more socially inclusive. McDonald’s, General 
Electric, Procter & Gamble, and many of the major tech companies, among 
others, were defining health and other legal benefits for same-sex partners before 
the Supreme Court legalized gay marriage. Apple, Pfizer, Microsoft, Deutsche 
Bank, PayPal, and Marriott, among others, spoke out or protested the North 
Carolina law that sought to specify which restrooms transgender people had to 
use; the outcry led to the eventual repeal of the law.273  
 
Cowen’s reasoning for these outcomes falls in line with many of the early doux 
commerce theorists, namely businesses do not “want any group of...customers to feel put 
out or discriminated against or to have cause for complaint...Profit maximization 
alone...puts business these days on the side of inclusion and tolerance.”274 While these 
opposing examples are certainly interesting, the validity of doux commerce cannot be 
verified/falsified based on a handful of anecdotes. What do the data suggest?275 
Survey data can shed light on the relationship between market systems and the 
attitudes towards others. One study of international survey data finds “patriotism” 
(defined as a sense of national superiority) and “chauvinism” (defined as a “my country 
right or wrong” mentality) to be positively associated with opposition to global markets 
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across multiple countries.276 A 2003 study finds that anticapitalist views increase 
nationalism and ethnic intolerance among a number of formerly communist countries. 
With the exception of Austria, “anticapitalistic sentiments in the post-communist 
countries have the strongest influence on nationalist attitudes...[T]he results support the 
hypothesis that nationalism stems from a resentment against the economic rationalization 
of society, which is mainly held by people with lower social status.”277 Other studies 
show pro-trade attitudes to be negatively related to isolationism, nationalism, 
ethnocentrism, prejudice, and a high attachment to one’s own neighborhood.278 One pair 
of researchers finds that Americans with negative attitudes towards outsourcing suffer 
from an “us versus them” world view. They write:  
The effects of [isolationism, nationalism, and ethnocentrism] are relatively large 
and independent of variables associated with self-interest and information. A 
change from the least globally interventionist attitudes registered by respondents 
to the polar opposite increases the predicted probability of consistently supporting 
outsourcing roughly five times. A shift from the least ethnocentric views to the 
most ethnocentric views increases the predicted value of consistently opposing 
outsourcing by over 50 percent as well. And a switch from the least nationalistic 
attitudes expressed to the most nationalistic increases this predicted probability by 
roughly 25 percent.279 
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While these studies find a correlation between various forms of prejudice and 
trade attitudes, a 2014 study indicates that prejudice and nationalism play a primary, 
causal role in American opposition to international trade. The findings are “both real and 
strong: prejudice greatly increases protectionism.”280 In each of these studies, support for 
global commerce conflicts with intolerant attitudes toward foreigners and other 
ethnicities. 
Employing data from the General Social Surveys from 1977 to 2010, 
Northwestern’s James Lindgren finds that intolerance, racism, anti-capitalism, and pro-
redistribution go hand-in-hand. (Lindgren distinguishes between racism and intolerance, 
the latter referring to groups like racists, homosexuals, communists, militarists, and 
atheists.) Even after controlling for gender, logged income, education, age, and year of 
survey, Lindgren shows that “racism and intolerance still significantly predict 
redistribution and anti-capitalism.”281 Lindgren’s analysis leads him to conclude, “Those 
who support capitalism and freer markets and oppose greater income redistribution tend 
to be better educated, to have higher family incomes, to be less traditionally racist, and to 
be less intolerant of unpopular groups.”282 
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Several studies by economists Niclas Berggren and Therese Nilsson investigate 
the relationship between tolerance, economic freedom, and globalization. The evidence 
they gather from 59 countries suggests a (weak) causal relationship between economic 
globalization and the willingness of parents to teach their children tolerance.283 More 
specifically, their analysis of 69 countries finds that economic freedom plays a seemingly 
causal role in parents teaching their children tolerance as well as fostering tolerance 
toward homosexuals and people of different races (though the relationship to the latter 
appears to be largely insignificant).284 In particular, property-protecting, contract-
enforcing legal systems and monetary stability have the strongest impact on tolerance. 
“The former...creates assurance that makes people not fear interaction with others. The 
market process is in turn enabled by the rule of law and makes possible this interaction 
between people, which can bring about tolerance, through internalization of an attitude of 
openness and generosity, through a conscious desire to advance one’s well-being or 
through reduced group pressure.”285 The latter “brings about more predictability and less 
arbitrary redistribution, which reduces social tensions and scapegoating, especially of 
groups with conspicuous consumption[.]”286 Focusing solely on the United States, 
Berggren and Nilsson find a similar causality: economic freedom increases tolerance 
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towards homosexuals, atheists, and communists.287 Another study of 68 countries finds 
that economic freedom increases tolerance toward homosexuals, particularly in societies 
that are high in trust: “the ability of formal institutions and market-oriented policy to 
generate tolerance is stronger the more people trust each other (and nonexistent at low 
trust levels). Hence, we expect institutional reform aiming to achieve more tolerance 
succeed best in high-trusting societies.”288 Given economic freedom’s positive 
association with trust (discussed in Ch. 2), this means that commerce could possibly play 
a dual role.   
A more recent study by Berggren and Nilsson shows economic freedom’s mixed 
record when it comes to anti-Semitism. While the quality of legal systems has a negative 
relationship with anti-Semitism, market openness has a positive one.289 The authors 
suggest that the relationship between market openness and anti-Semitism is likely be 
explained by anti-Semitic stereotypes about Jews and their association with money, 
usury, and markets. For example, in his 1844 essay “On the Jewish Question,” Karl Marx 
declares that (a) “self-interest” is the very basis of Judaism, (b) money is the real God of 
the Jews, and (c) “huckstering” is the true Jewish religion.290 Marx argues that these 
peculiarly Jewish characteristics and values had now become widespread due to the 
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corrupting influence of the market system.291 “For Marx,” writes historian Jerry Muller, 
“Jew-bashing becomes a tool for bashing the bourgeoisie.”292 However, other empirical 
studies underscore the role commercial ties can play in eroding anti-Semitism.  
When the Black Death hit Europe in the 14th century, Jews were scapegoated and 
intensely persecuted. Yet, when Protestant and Catholic regions of plague-stricken 
Germany are compared, anti-Semitic persecution is found to be lower in Catholic 
areas.293 This is due to the medieval Catholic Church’s ethic against usury and the role 
Jews played as moneylenders in these cities. In Protestant cities, Jews played a less 
economically complementary role, leaving them open to greater persecution. “These 
results suggest that when there are latent biases against minorities, shocks can lead to 
biases manifesting themselves as persecutions...However, when the minority and 
majority communities engage in economically complementary activities, then these 
relationships may be a powerful way to reduce inter-group conflict.”294 Furthermore, 
researchers find that German areas of more intense anti-Semitic persecution following the 
Black Death were also more likely to manifest anti-Semitic acts and attitudes in the first 
half of the 20th century (e.g., voting for the Nazi Party, more synagogue attacks during 
the “Night of Broken Glass”). However, these same researchers find that “cities with a 
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strong tradition of long-distance trade...show significantly lower persistence [of anti-
Semitism] over the long term than other communities.”295  
Other, more qualitative evidence supports the studies above. In the 1990s, India 
moved away from a socialist command economy and adopted market-oriented reforms. 
In a book-length treatment of the results of this economic liberalization, economists 
Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya find that the growth since the reforms has 
reduced poverty nationwide in both rural and urban regions alike as well as among the 
most socially disadvantaged groups.296 This has initiated what economic journalist 
Swaminathan Aiyar calls an “assault on the Indian caste system.”297 Dalits occupy the 
lowest level of this caste hierarchy, to the point of being called “untouchables.” However, 
Dalit journalist Chandra Bhan Prasad argues that India’s economic boom has been “a 
golden period for Dalits...Because of the new market economy, material markers are 
replacing social markers. Dalits can buy rank in the market economy. India is moving 
from a caste-based to a class-based society, where if you have all the goodies in life and 
your bank account is booming, you are acceptable.”298 This has led to the creation of 
what seemed before to be an impossibility: a successful class of Dalit entrepreneurs.299 
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Survey data out of Uttar Pradesh also indicate that major shifts in social practices have 
taken place since 1990.300 To name a few: dalits were often seated separately--essentially 
segregated--at non-dalit weddings in 1990. By 2007, this had become a rare occurrence. 
Non-dalits almost never accepted food or drink from dalits when visiting a dalit home in 
the early 1990s. By 2007, accepting food/drink had risen to over 70% in eastern Uttar 
Pradesh and nearly 50% in the west. Non-dalits almost never midwifed for dalit births in 
1990. By 2007, it had become a regular occurrence in eastern Uttar Pradesh (though it 
still remains extremely low in the west). While the direct relationship between India’s 
market reforms and these social changes is not established, it does fit the pattern of 
economic liberalization driving social innovation. 
In his popular Capitalism and Freedom, the late Milton Friedman dedicates a 
chapter to the market’s relation to discrimination. Drawing on Gary Becker’s 
groundbreaking work,301 Friedman writes, “[T]he preserves of discrimination in any 
society are the areas that are most monopolistic in character, whereas discrimination 
against groups of particular color or religion is least in those areas where there is the 
greatest freedom competition.”302 He explains that this is due to the higher costs of 
discrimination: “The man who objects to buying from or working alongside a Negro, for 
example, thereby limits his range of choice. He will generally have to pay a higher price 
for what he buys or receive a lower return for his work. Or, put the other way, those of us 
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who regard color of skin or religion as irrelevant can buy some things more cheaply as a 
result.”303 
Economist Jennifer Roback’s investigation into Jim Crow era regulations yields a 
number of discoveries relevant to Friedman’s claim. Looking into streetcar segregation 
laws across Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee and Texas, Roback finds “that 
segregation laws did not simply codify an already existing, well-established social 
custom. On the contrary, contemporary reports indicate that whites and blacks 
customarily sat where they chose on municipal streetcars in the absence of segregation 
ordinances.” Furthermore, “the streetcar companies frequently resisted segregation, both 
as custom and law.” In line with Friedman’s insight above, Roback finds, “The reason 
they most often gave was that separate cars and sections would be too expensive. In 
addition, there is little indication that pressure for segregation came from the average 
white passenger.”304 Overall, Roback concludes, “There is little indication that streetcar 
companies initiated legislation or that they would have segregated in the absence of 
legislation.”305 In other words, left to the market, greater tolerance would have prevailed.  
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Elsewhere, Roback identifies a number of labor market restrictions that were a 
means of solidifying white supremacy.306 Drawing on the work of Robert Higgs,307 
Roback points to four main labor market regulations:  
(1) enticement laws and contract-enforcement laws, which were designed to limit 
competition in the labor market to the beginning of each contract year; (2) 
vagrancy laws, which were designed to prevent blacks from being unemployed or 
otherwise out of the labor force; (3) emigrant-agent laws, which were designed to 
restrict the activities of labor recruiters; and (4) the convict-lease system, which 
provided punishment for blacks who violated the above or other laws.308 
 
Roback finds that all four laws reduced black labor competition, both directly and 
indirectly. She notes that if racial intolerance at the social level had been enough to 
exclude blacks from the labor force, these laws would have been unnecessary. The 
existence of the laws indicate that blacks proved to be competitive in the labor market 
when allowed to freely engage in exchange. “When social pressure, economic power, and 
custom proved insufficient to...enforce discrimination against blacks,” Roback writes, 
“the southern elite resorted to restrictive labor laws. The evidence indicates that the laws 
were invoked to keep the market from bettering the condition of blacks.”309 Other 
scholars have come to similar conclusions, highlighting various laws such as (but 
certainly not limited to) the minimum wage that were implemented for the purpose of 
crowding-out competitive blacks from the market.310 This signals to Roback that 
                                                          
306 Jennifer Roback, “Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competitive?” The University 
of Chicago Law Review 51:4 (1984): 1161-1192; “Exploitation in the Jim Crow South: The Market or the 
Law?” Regulation 8:5 (Sept/Dec, 1984): 37-43. 
307 Robert Higgs, Competition and Coercion: Blacks in the American Economy, 1865-1914 (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1977). 
308 Roback, “Southern Labor Law,” 1163-1164. 
309 Roback, “Exploitation in the Jim Crow South,” 43. 
310 E.g., David E. Bernstein, Only One Place of Redress: African Americans, Labor Regulations, and the 




“effective discrimination could not persist without the active assistance of 
government”311 and, therefore, “it is government, not private individuals, that must be 
restrained if disfavored minorities are to make substantial economic progress.”312  
A clever set of experiments with Bangladeshi rice buyers and rice farmers 
demonstrate the eroding effects of market competition on ethnic discrimination.313 The 
researchers first tested the prejudices of ethnic majority rice buyers by assigning both 
ethnic majority and minority names to different rice samples. The results show no 
indication of ethnic discrimination from these professional middlemen when it comes to 
their evaluations of rice quality. “However,” the researchers write,  
we found evidence of discrimination against ethnic minority farmers in terms of 
quoted price that differs across buyers’ type. In particular, we found that ethnic 
majority local buyers who have local monopsony power quoted a 2.7% lower 
price for rice associated with ethnic minority sounding names than what they 
quoted for rice produced by farmers with ethnic majority sounding names. 
However, this was not true for wholesale buyers who operate in a competitive 
environment. They quoted the same price for rice whether it was from an ethnic 
minority or a majority farmer. We also found that, on average, the prices quoted 
by wholesale buyers operating in a perfect competition market were higher than 
those of local buyers who have local monopsony power.314 
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A follow-up experiment tested these same rice buyers in other-other allocation 
games. These games paired a buyer with two rice farmers: one ethnic majority and one 
ethnic minority. Without keeping any for one’s self, a buyer would then have to decide 
how to split a sum of money between the two farmers. The game results show that both 
local and wholesale buyers prefer ethnic majority farmers, with splits generally being 
about 60/40 in favor of the ethnic majority. The researchers then surveyed these buyers, 
finding that both local and wholesale buyers hold similar negative views of ethnic 
minorities.  
All-in-all, the researchers conclude that both local and wholesale buyers are 
prejudiced against ethnic minorities. Yet, wholesale buyers quote the same price for both 
ethnic majority and minority farmers whereas local buyers do not. “This suggests that the 
taste-based discrimination that these buyers have against the ethnic minority group—the 
existence of which is supported by our second experiment— can be eliminated if 
competition is strong enough.”315 
Summary 
“Contra the pessimists,” writes Nate Oman, “exchange within a market tends to 
make people more attentive and responsive to others’ points of view.”316 This overview 
of the evidence demonstrates that greater market liberalization is associated with (1) more 
fair and equal exchanges, (2) greater gender equality, and (3) more tolerant behavior and 
attitudes toward others. While some evidence for the latter is slightly more qualitative, 
the pattern of evidence matches that of the more empirical studies. The last two of the 
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Big Six can therefore be answered in the affirmative: commerce does promote and is 






















During the 19th century debates over slavery, many of the institution’s most ardent 
defenders opposed market liberalization as being antithetical to the Southern slave 
economy.317 One such example is George Fitzhugh, who the famously-caned Radical 
Republican Charles Sumner described as “a leading writer among Slave-masters.”318 In 
Sociology for the South, Fitzhugh argues that “Laissez-faire and “Pas trop gouvener” 
[“Govern not too much”], are at war with all kinds of slavery, for they in fact assert that 
individuals and peoples prosper most when governed least.”319 Elsewhere, he defines 
“political economy” as “‘Laissez-faire,’ or ‘Let it alone’” and describes it as the “false 
philosophy of the age.”320 It is “tainted with abolition, and at war with our institutions.” 
Therefore, his recommendation to the South is “to throw Adam Smith, Say, Ricardo & 
Co., in the fire.”321 
Defenders of slavery like Fitzhugh understood the emancipatory nature of 
economic liberalism. The writings of classical liberal thinkers and free traders like Adam 
Smith, Jean-Baptiste Say, and David Ricardo were recognized as a threat to the racial 
hierarchy of the South. The evidence presented in this thesis provides a good reason as to 
why. 
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For proponents of the doux commerce theory, commerce was an important part of 
the grander project of liberalism. As Fukuyama describes it, liberalism is “an institutional 
solution to the problem of governing diversity…a system for peacefully managing 
diversity in pluralistic societies…a pragmatic tool for resolving conflicts in diverse 
societies[.]”322 Economic liberalism was considered integral to this project. Doux 
commerce theorists argued that market exchange brings with it a bundle of liberal habits 
and attitudes. These habits and attitudes can be boiled down to the Big Six: (1) Peace, (2) 
Honesty, (3) Trust, (4) Cooperation, (5) Fairness, and (6) Tolerance.  
Yet, when Enlightenment thinkers put forth the doux commerce theory, data to 
test these assumptions were lacking. More than two centuries later, we have various 
strands of empirical social science that can help determine whether these pro-commerce 
thinkers were correct. As this thesis has shown, the doux commerce theorists were right: 
commercial societies are more peaceful, less corrupt, more trusting and trustworthy, more 
cooperative, and more fair and tolerant in their treatment of others. In several cases, the 
relationship between markets and these attributes were shown to be causal. In other cases, 
there was merely a positive relationship with the Big Six (very rarely was there no 
relationship or a negative one). As Brennan notes, “This kind of empirical work is not the 
final word. It does not decisively prove that market societies foster better motivations 
than [non-market] societies. However, it is better than hypothesizing from the armchair, 
as philosophers are apt to do.”323 
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The empirical validity of doux commerce has several important implications. 
First, it is a point in favor of liberalism as a political philosophy. Doux commerce was 
part of a larger discussion regarding liberal society. Empirical backing for doux 
commerce is in part empirical backing for liberalism. Second, economic liberalism is a 
necessary, though not sufficient, part of liberalism. Commerce continues to be maligned 
even today based on prejudices against markets that go back millennia. Producing 
peaceful cooperation among diverse peoples requires economic freedom as much as it 
does political freedom. These two work in tandem.324 Finally, beyond any political 
validation, a proposed mechanism for reducing conflict and increasing peaceful 
cooperation has been shown to actually work. This should be a cause for celebration. And 
it should motivate policymakers to establish institutions and policies that allow 
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